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Sunni Islamists in Northern Lebanon: Relative Deprivation 
Reinforces Exclusionary Politics 
 
Nisrine Ghassan Barakeh 
  
  
ABSTRACT  
 
Sunni Islamist movements in Lebanon, particularly in the North, have grown in 
number against the backdrop of Syrian conflict. Islamist’s appeal has attracted a 
large segment of the Sunni youth population, radicalized by fear of Shiite and 
Alawite dominance. Mobilization has been based on sectarian indoctrination that 
stresses their distinction while pursuing an Islamic State. This thesis draws an 
investigatory situational analysis in order to reveal the development of various 
Islamists strands in Northern Lebanon. It questions Islamists’ willingness to join the 
Lebanese consociational system and explores prerequisites for their participation. 
The research design reveals the circumstances under which a sectarian exclusionary 
movement may ultimately yield to consociationalism and power sharing political 
arrangement.  The hypothesis associates relative deprivation views with 
consociational and plural politics. A series of interviews with Salafist leaders and 
activists demonstrate views toward own state of affairs, compared to others, and 
ultimately capture comparative different attitude toward coexistence and power 
sharing. 
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Chapter One 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Following the outburst of the Lebanese Civil War in 1975, the Arab League 
deployed an Arab Deterrent Force in Lebanon to restore security. The force was 
mainly made up of Syrian troops yet there were other Arab states participating like 
Saudi Arabia, Libya and others.  Later in the 1979, all the Arab forces left Lebanon, 
leaving the Syrian troops alone in the country. Tripoli, Lebanon’s second largest city 
has had a fair share of the Syrian guardianship up till 2005. Recalling political 
practices, Tripoli Islamists elicit atrocities committed from Hafez Al Asad, the 
longest reigning president his son equally. In February 2005, Syrian fingerprints 
were associated with the Hariri assassination, the fact that triggered Sunni rage 
against the suspected regime. After the 2005 Cedar Revolution, Syrian troops 
withdrew from Lebanon. Hezbollah, Syria’s biggest ally, called its supporters for a 
movement to thank the regime for achievements during its presence, an act that 
generated feelings of humiliation and fear among Sunnis. In May 2008, Hezbollah 
invaded Beirut Sunni neighborhoods in an attempt to halt a governmental decision to 
limit Hezbollah’s strategic communication system. The turbulent May events 
significantly damaged the relations between Sunnis and Shiites in Lebanon. 
With the eruption of the Syrian uprising in 2011, Sunni Islamists in Northern 
Lebanon observed a prominent opportunity to pay a debt back to the Syrian regime 
by supporting Islamic movements and sending Jihadists to fight in Syria. In this 
regard, Islamist activism has been rising while attracting sympathy from anti-regime 
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Sunnis. Hezbollah’s active participation alongside the Syrian regime in Syria and 
against Sunni rebellions, gave Tripoli Jihadists another reason to protect Sunnis. 
Islamists emphasized the need to strengthen themselves in the country in order to 
possibly change the Sunni prevailing weakness. 
While comparing Hezbollah to Islamists, similarities seem to be numerous. 
Hezbollah resembles Tripoli’s Sunni Jihadists in ideology and resistance, though the 
element of resistance varies. Hezbollah first started as an Islamic movement and was 
then fully integrated into the Lebanese consociational system. Likewise, Tripoli 
Islamists base their strategies on Islamic ideology and the idea of protecting the 
oppressed (Agha, n.d.) Trying to gain power in that sense, the question remains 
vague whether Islamists are willing to duplicate Hezbollah’s successful experience 
(Are Salafis Preparing to Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). 
Integrating Islamists into the Lebanese consociational system requires preset 
conditions. This thesis examines the possibility and the pre-requisites prior to 
Islamists’ integration. The chief emphasis will link Islamists’ exclusionary politics to 
relative deprivation. 
This study aims to understand the link between consociationalism and relative 
deprivation theory. It is a research project designed to examine how 
consociationalism is attained when parties have equal balance of power. The thesis 
addresses the central research question: “Are Tripoli Islamists willing to join the 
Lebanese consociational system and under what conditions?”  
 Sunni Islamists have always expressed their need to establish an Islamic state. They 
have showed no interest in participating in the current political system. After the 
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Syrian Civil War many Da’wa Salafists1 have shifted their interest from being solely 
religious to being more politically religious. It is evident that many Salafists are 
being more politically oriented which is clearly portrayed in their speeches and social 
media discourse (Abdo, 2015).  
It is unclear though whether Islamists at the moment strive to join the Lebanese 
consociational system or not. For them, they have been marginalized and abused by 
this system mainly via the imprisonment of their Islamists. Their intention to accept 
consociationalism and the extent to which Tripoli Sunnis support this seems 
ambiguous. When it comes to voicing out Sunni social rights, local Tripoli Sunnis 
demonstrate support. They have continuously urged for having a strong Sunni 
representation, especially in the current vacant Sunni leadership (Neriah, 2012). 
This study will first question Islamists’ willingness to join the Lebanese 
consociational system and the conditions linked to this participation. It will correlate 
integration with relative deprivation. When Islamists feel deprived and weak, does it 
seem possible to incorporate them within the Lebanese consociational system? Will 
diminishing relative deprivation facilitate containing Islamists in the Lebanese 
system? Given the current vacant Sunni leadership, do Islamists stand a chance to 
become the new Sunni representatives?  
Islamists’ appeal has attracted a large segment of the young Sunni population, 
radicalized by fear of Shiite and Alawite dominance. Mobilization has been based on 
sectarian indoctrination that stresses Islamist distinction while pursuing an Islamic 
State. This thesis draws an investigatory situational analysis in order to reveal the 
development of various Islamist strands in Northern Lebanon. It questions Islamists’ 
                                                          
1 Salafists who call for Islam through preaching 
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willingness to join the Lebanese consociational system and explores the pre-
requisites to this. When many of the internal political struggles are based on the 
relation between Islamists and the government, Hezbollah and their allies, it is 
important to understand the detrimental causes behind Islamists’ political discourse. 
Within the current rise of radical Islamism in the region, it is of utmost importance to 
understand and then contain the growth of such movements in Northern Lebanon, 
particularly when those groups receive attentive sympathy from the Sunni masses. 
Sympathy associated with political deprivation may lead to political exclusion and 
strengthen radicalism. This research questions whether social and political equalities 
are the prerequisites to Islamists’ integration in the Lebanese consociational system. 
Integration means that the existence of those clusters is formalized and therefore 
their movements are observed. Linking relative deprivation to radicalism aims to 
understand when people shift to radical solutions. Perceiving this link proclaims that 
groups reach out for violent means when they are relatively deprived, which is 
happening at the moment all over the region. 
This chapter offers a brief introduction to the research topic. It relies on some 
research review to introduce Islamists rise in Northern Lebanon, the Sunni-Shiite 
relationship, and the Relative Deprivation Theory.  It also briefly explains the 
methodology used in the research and the statement of need. At the end of this 
chapter the hypothesis is presented followed by the significance of this research. 
 
1.1 The rise of Islamists in Northern Lebanon 
 
Following the Syrian Civil War, Islamist activism has been rising in Northern 
Lebanon. Therefore, understanding Salafism offers a better understanding of 
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Salafists’ approaches and objectives. Salafists’ emergence dates back to the 13th 
century. Rabil (2015) classifies Salafism into three main categories, quietists, 
activists and Salafi Jihadists. Quietest groups call for Islam through Islamic 
education; activists are those who are unsatisfied with their current governments and 
call for change in the political representation whereas Jihadists are those who aim at 
going back to the golden era of Islam through holy war or Jihad. Rabil highlights the 
role of the Lebanese army in fighting Islamist Jihadists and foresees their takeover if 
the Lebanese army falls down. According to him, the fall down of the Lebanese 
government will make Islamists soldiers representing Sunnis (Rabil, 2015).  
Similarly, Dr. Jacques Neriah, a special analyst for the Middle East at the Jerusalem 
Center for Public Affairs, in his article “The Rise of the Salafist in Lebanon: A New 
Sunni-Shiite Battlefield” examines the rise of Salafism and the Sunni- Shiite 
battlefield. According to Neriah, the new Sunni leadership is represented by 
Islamists. The past experience in the Arab world shows that Islamists were able to 
take over when traditional Sunni leaders failed to do the job. In Lebanon, when 
Sunni moderate leaders failed to voice out the Sunni community needs, Islamists 
filled the gap and came into power.   
Islamists, being the extension of the Arab Salafism, have been in Lebanon for fifty 
years. In Northern Lebanon they are concentrated in Tripoli, Akkar and Donniyeh. 
During the Syrian presence in Lebanon, they were not publically active and were 
only so after the Syrian withdrawal from Lebanon, and widely flourishing after the 
Syrian anti-regime uprising in 2011 (Neriah, 2012). In her research about Salafism 
and the use of social media in such momentums, Geneive Abdo, remarks that with 
the absence of Sunni leaders, Sunnis seem to be targeted and hence Islamists need to 
take action. As a fellow in the Center for Middle East Policy at Brookings and a 
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fellow in the Middle East/Southwest Asia program at the Stimson Center, Abdo 
published a study titled “Islamists and Sectarianism: Twitter and Communal Conflict 
in the Middle East” in which she explores non-violent Islamists groups that are using 
social media to express their views and gather public sympathy. Her study is divided 
into 3 different parts. The first part explains Islamists beliefs and how those have 
been altered after the Arab uprisings. The second and third parts feature key Islamist 
leaders and their use of social media in projecting their ideologies. Abdo reiterates 
the views of key Salafist figures on the Sunni –Shiite battlefield.  For these groups, 
Hezbollah, the Iranian project, and the American support associated with this, are 
seen as a major threat to Sunnis (Abdo, 2013). 
The Tripoli Islamist community has an increasing fear of being targeted and 
oppressed. They expressed their right to have their own beliefs, and call for them. 
According to them, they are passionate about their religion and values just as any 
other party is passionate about its values. Islamists do not see that they deserve 
oppression just because they believe in Islam and are calling for it (Ali, 2014). 
Stereotyping is triggering anger not only within Islamists but also within the Sunni 
public mass. Tripoli Sunnis have an anger reservoir for the 8th of March Syrian 
allies, specifically Hezbollah. Sunni residents flag concerns regarding the 
discrepancies between how the Lebanese army attacks Islamists disregarding 
Hezbollah’s actions (Williams, 2014). This discrepancy in treatment between 
Hezbollah and Islamists in addition to the difference in resource-availability among 
them is better examined in the coming section.  
1.2 Sunni-Shiite Battlefield 
 
In the aftermath of Hariri’s assassination, Hezbollah’s power in relation to that of the 
Sunni community has been frequently debated. Islamists have been emphasizing the 
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threat Hezbollah imposes on the Sunni Umma and therefore has continuously called 
for protective measures. Tripoli has long been known as the foundation of Sunni 
politics and the home for both Lebanese and Syrian Islamists. Most of these Islamist 
groups fiercely oppose the Assad regime in the neighboring country.  
With conflicts being infused with sectarianism, the Sunni Umma feels the threat of 
the growing Shiite-Alawite-Iranian coalition (Abdo, 2015). Shiites have always used 
Israel as the main threat. Likewise Sunnis are using the same strategy to justify their 
presence. For them, Shiites’ presence is similar to that of Israel.  According to Salafi 
leaders, Islam encourages plurality and coexistence but not to an extent that Sunnis 
become marginalized (Abdo, 2013).  
In an attempt to foresee Islamists integration in the Lebanese system, a comparative 
analysis is drawn between Hezbollah and Islamists. While Hezbollah and Sunni 
Islamists seem to be divergent, some political analysts have drawn similarities 
between the two groups. Hezbollah’s integration in the Lebanese political and social 
system is best examined in a thesis written by Thomas G. Esposito. “Political 
Integration of Hezbollah into Lebanese Politics”, examines how Hezbollah 
transformed from a terrorist group to a legitimate political participatory actor. 
Esposito highlights the need of balancing legitimacy and militancy towards Israel. In 
order to be integrated in the Lebanese society, Hezbollah needs to be attentive to the 
needs of Lebanon and its different factions.  
Trying to understand the transition of Hezbollah to a political party integrated in the 
Lebanese system, “The Shift in Hezbollah’s Ideology, Religious Ideology, Political 
Ideology and Political Program”, a dissertation by Joseph Al Agha, explores the 
development of Hezbollah’s Ideology. It focuses on three aspects: religious ideology, 
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political ideology, and political program. The research studies how the identity of 
Hezbollah changed in stages towards a realistic political program.  
In that sense, some political analysts have compared Sunni Salafists’ current rise to 
that of Hezbollah in the early 1980s. Although Islamists present weaponry and ability 
to mobilize masses, replicating the Hezbollah model will not work for several 
reasons. Unlike Islamist groups, Hezbollah did not gather its power overnight and the 
party choses its battles cautiously. This does not rule out an attempt of those groups 
to replicate the Hezbollah model and become the new “Sunni Hezbollah” (Are 
Salafis Preparing to Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). But are 
Islamists actually open to integration? Within their public discourses they often refer 
to the unfair treatment they are receiving and to the minimal resources they enjoy in 
compare to what other groups enjoy. Therefore this study suggests that participation 
is linked to relative deprivation. So what is relative deprivation? The coming section 
explicates this theory. 
1.3 Relative deprivation theory 
 
Relative deprivation theory considers that violence or terrorism is inspired by people 
who feel an existing gap between their expectation and the attained outcomes in a 
society (Gurr, 1970). Recent studies show that terrorists have been from wealthy 
backgrounds. “Relative deprivation theory in terrorism: a study of higher education 
and unemployment as predictors of terrorism”, a research conducted by Clare 
Richardson (2011), shows that the correlation between unemployment and higher 
education, which reflects relative deprivation, is associated with an increase in 
terrorist attacks. The study shows that when what is expected is higher than what is 
received, people tend to shift towards violence. Feelings of injustice are caused by 
the fact that what an individual “actually” receives is way less than what s/he is 
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“entitled” to. The concept of relative deprivation dates back to ancient Greece 
(Richardson, 2011). Aristotle articulated the idea that revolution is driven by a 
relative sense or feeling of inequality, rather than an absolute measure. 
Dissatisfaction leads to frustration, and frustration leads to aggression (Richardson, 
2011).   
Delving into the causes behind terrorism seems to be quite challenging. Opinions 
vary and analysis are dispersed. Poverty, education and literacy, and oppression and 
liberalization are social factors that lead to terrorism (Ziemke, n.d.). Poverty may be 
an indicator of radicalization in the Muslim world, yet it is not solely responsible for 
the emergence of such movements. For instance, September 11, 2001 attacks against 
New York and Washington were planned, organized and implemented by a well off 
leader who comes from a middle class family. There is little empirical research that 
suggests poverty is the cause behind the rise of terrorism (Ziemke, n.d.). While none 
of the poor societies in the world seem to have organized terrorist movements, it also 
appears that lessening poverty still leads to an increase in the emergence of those 
movements.  Oppression may be one basis for terrorism during periods of 
democratization and freedom. During those periods people notice an increase in 
radical Islamic movements. Terrorist movements emerge when there is a change and 
not when everything is stable. Yet it has never been proven that poverty and the rise 
of terrorism are directly correlated (Ziemke, n.d.). 
Discrimination or social inequality may push people to join radical movements. 
“Islamic Extremist Terrorism: The Public's Perception of its Causes”, a research 
study published by Lauren Whitehair (2012) investigates the public opinion of what 
people think the reasons behind the rise of terrorism are. The key themes discussed 
are religious influences, social influences, discrimination, political revenge, 
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psychological explanations and demographic features. Results show that religion, 
social influences, humiliation and discrimination all play a role in the rise of Islamic 
extremism (2012). Linking relative deprivation to radical arrangements, Hellen 
Hjordt Hansen (n.d.) uses Relative Deprivation Theory (RDT) as a tool to explain 
some social movements. In her study, “Salafi-jihadists in Syria: A Social Movement 
Theory Analysis”, Hansen explains that when a group feels deprived of a right, they 
tend to call for change and thus sometimes join radical movements. The study 
believes that deprivation illustrated by political restrictions and control combined 
with other factors lead to Islamic mobilization (Hansen, n.d.) 
The reasons behind the rise of extremism support have been revisited by many 
scholars. Another article supporting relative deprivation theory is Ömer Taşpınar’s 
article, “You Can’t Understand Why People Join ISIS without Understanding 
Relative Deprivation.”  Omer argues that although ideology, religion, culture and 
socioeconomic factors are valid reasons behind the rise of ISIS, yet relative 
deprivation is a much more valid base for their rise. The “growing gap between 
expectations and opportunities lead to ideological radicalization” (2015). Trying to 
understand why people join radical movements is not simple, especially when many 
factors intersect. People tend to use violence when they are frustrated, and they are 
often frustrated because they feel deprived of a right. When frustration becomes 
prolonged, it leads to aggression. Political violence is the outcome of collective 
discontent (Gurr, 1970). 
Relative deprivation therefore offers a better explanation of why some Islamists 
resolve to violence to achieve their objectives. According to this theory 
consociationalism does not seem to be the desired path to achieve slamists’ demands.  
1.4 Consociationalism in relation To Islamists’ deprivation 
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Fundamentalist religions like Judaism, Christianity in the past and Islam currently, 
share common ideologies when it comes to refusing multiculturalism. Some argue 
that governments cannot suppress religions and confine to only one broad religion 
because this will lead to bloodshed. According to those, when there is a democratic 
governance and separation of government from state, each religion practices its 
beliefs without dominating the other. Therefore, when religious freedom is 
emphasized, religions may not discriminate against each other. In this pluralistic 
society, law would grant intellectual freedom to those who abide by it and would 
deny rights to those who reduce the freedom of others (Crabtree, 2012). 
In sectarian divided societies like Lebanon, some suggest that consociationalism 
seems to be the best political democratic practice. Lijphart proposes consociational 
democracy as a remedy for pluralistic divided societies. According to him, when 
traditional majoritarian democracy does not work for societies that are deeply 
divided over ethnic or religious cleavages, consociationalism seems to do (Lijphart, 
1977). Critics of the Lebanese consociationalism argue that this system has deepened 
political divisions instead. In this thesis, whether Tripoli Islamists are willing to join 
such a system at the moment will be questioned. The main aim of the thesis is to 
delve into the pre-requisites to integration. According to Islamists, they have been 
feeling marginalized and deprived for so long. Taking that perspective, and if relative 
deprivation diminishes, would Islamists think of being part of this consociational 
system? 
At the time being, non-violent Salafists are actively using social media to raise their 
concerns regarding Shiism, Syria and Iran combined (Abdo, 2015). Those Salafists 
are using social media to gain public attention. Although much attention is given to 
Salafi Jihadists yet those Salafists also have an enormous influence in destabilizing 
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the region while voicing out their concerns. The absence of a Lebanese Sunni 
leadership has given these Sunnis a chance to grow in influence. As the Syrian war 
continues and spreads on the Lebanese borders, moderate Islamists are being 
compared to Hezbollah during the 1980s mobilizing for support in Lebanon. Those 
Islamists acknowledge that they represent only five to six percent of the whole 
Lebanese population.  One of the prominent Salafists in Tripoli is Sheikh Salem 
Rafiei. Rafiei started as D’awa Salafist, yet some believe that his ideas have become 
very extreme (Abdo, 2015). In that sense, he has been politically active for many 
years. Recently, he said that “[the Sunnis] see their political leaders as weak…today, 
the pulse of the street in Lebanon is with the Salafists” (as cited in Abdo, 2015). 
In Tripoli, there seems to be sympathy with Jabhat al Nusra and ISIS among Sunnis. 
Logically when Sunnis feel alienated from the state they tend to sympathize or 
affiliate more with extremist groups. If this trend continues, there will be ominous 
consequences for Lebanon and the region (El-Husseini, 2014). In June 2015, two 
videos were leaked to the media showing torture of Islamist prisoners in Roumieh 
prison. Torture practiced by the Lebanese Security Forces exacerbated anger among 
Tripoli Sunnis in general and Islamists specifically. In an interview with an 
anonymous Tripoli resident, the interviewee admitted that if it were his brother in the 
video, he would have joined ISIS directly (El-Husseini, 2014). Despotism, associated 
with this incident among others, leads to frustration, and frustration is causing those 
deprived to choose extremist paths.  
According to a Salafist Sheikh Nabil Rahim, the Sunni Ministry of Interior, which 
Sunnis believed would enforce justice equally among Sunnis and Shiites, has been 
behaving disgracefully. Rahim adds that the Roumieh scandal has increased Sunni 
doubt about justice in the current Lebanese system. Following the security plan 
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implemented in Tripoli, Sunni youth still feel politically marginalized. They feel that 
the plan has been only applied in the north and not in Hezbollah’s territories. 
Furthermore, those youth have clearly stated that the future movement who was 
supposed to protect them and defend the Sunni Umma have instead took decisions 
against the Sunni community, marginalizing and restricting them. Most of the times, 
Sunnis feel that their back is not protected (El-Husseini, 2014). Deprivation 
associated with this drives Islamists away from the system and more into extremism. 
Through many interviews Sunnis regard Hezbollah as their enemy specifically after 
the party engaged itself fully in the Syrian war against Sunni rebellions. In addition, 
many of the Tripoli youths feel that they no longer have any political or religious 
leadership” (El-Husseini, 2014). 
Many Islamists feel that their grievances are not given any attention by political 
leaders in the country. This is why they are resolving to exclusionary politics. Studies 
show that 67% of Tripoli population lives below poverty line. Poverty and 
unemployment in that sense partly justify the rise in extremism in the city. Also, the 
dual bombings in Tripoli have led many Islamic scholars to declare that from that 
moment on Sunnis of Tripoli will be resolving their own matters without the need for 
a government. Islamists blamed Alawites backed up by Hezbollah and the Syrian 
regime for the bombings. 
Sheikh Salem Al Shahal, one of the prominent Salafists in Tripoli, frequently voiced 
his criticism not only against the Lebanese government, but also against all those he 
sees as being involved with the “conspiracy…targeting the Sunni sect to make way 
for the Iranian project.” Furthermore, al Shahal has continued to maintain that the 
Sunnis of Lebanon were being specifically targeted: “Lebanon is held hostage and 
[its] army is treating its people as the Syrian army treats its people” (as cited in 
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Abdo, 2015).  In this sense, it seems that Islamists are not open to the current 
Lebanese system. The thesis will look into whether Islamists could be incorporated 
in the Lebanese system when relative deprivation diminishes. 
 
1.5 Hypothesis 
 
Incidents in the Arab world have shown that whenever there is a lack of a Sunni led 
state, non-state actors, specifically Sunnis took over and filled the vacuum (Abdo, 
2015). In Lebanon, Islamists took advantage of Hariri’s absence and portrayed 
themselves as Sunni defenders. Sunnis in Tripoli have accumulated feelings of 
deprivation. Socially from poverty and politically from Hezbollah’s privilege in the 
Lebanese consociational system. There has been a speculation that feelings of 
deprivation and lack of security is pushing Islamists towards replicating Hezbollah’s 
model by arming themselves away from the Lebanese state (Are Salafis Preparing to 
Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). The question remains whether 
Hezbollah model is feasible and desirable to Sunnis. Although the majority of Sunnis 
feel dissatisfied, only a minority of them support Sunni militarization (Are Salafis 
Preparing to Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). Yet several 
incidents have showed that Islamists are well armed, like the deployment of armed 
militants in the aftermath of arresting a key Salafist figure Chadi Mawlawi.  
Like Hezbollah, Salafists’ thoughts are grounded on religion, yet they also have a 
political agenda. They fight against Bashar al Assad, they oppose policies of Western 
governments, and they warn against Iran’s excessive interventions and ambition for 
greater influence in the Sunni Arab world. In addition, some are critical of the Sunni 
monarchies in the Gulf, and they present themselves as alternatives to the purists 
who tow the government line in some Gulf States. When discussions come to Sunni-
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Shiite boundaries, Hezbollah argues that the religious differences between the two 
sects, Sunni and Shiites do not prevent unity and cooperation on common political-
ideological concepts such as anti-imperialism, anti-Zionism, “the liberation of 
Jerusalem”, and so forth. In fact, such common ideologies have led to cooperation 
between Hezbollah and Sunni groups such as the Lebanese Harakat Al-Tawhid Al-
Islamiyya and Al-Jama‘a Al-Islamiyya (Abdo, 2013). 
At the time being, Sunni Islamists do not seem as open to dialogue and cooperation 
with other political parties specifically Hezbollah, who for them has been and still is 
shedding the blood of Sunnis. Taking this into account, Islamists integration into the 
Lebanese consociational system becomes difficult. Comparing that to Hezbollah’s 
experience, it is worth mentioning that the latter was able to successfully join the 
Lebanese politics only when it became open to other Lebanese groups like the 
Christians. To what extent could Islamists replicate Hezbollah’s successful 
experience? What are the pre-requisites of having another Islamic group joining the 
Lebanese consociational system? 
The Lebanese system is based on sectarian divisions and representation in the 
parliament is divided accordingly among different sects who are represented by the 
Zu’ama. In the consociational system cooperation is sought among all communities. 
Lijphart has defined this as a challenging factor especially when a decision seeks 
consent from all players the process becomes complicated and is mainly 
characterized by delay (Barclay, 2007). Arend Lijphart highlights the importance of 
having different relationships among different actors in a consociational system. He 
defines those relationships as favorable to the “establishment and persistence of 
consociational democracy.”  These relationships are among leaders themselves, 
between the public and between the leaders and the public (Barclay, 2007). If the 
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consicoaitonal system seeks cooperation among leaders from different sects, could 
this cooperation decrease the deprivation feelings among Islamists? Could power 
sharing solve the relative deprivation issue? It is actually the other way round. Only 
when relative deprivation diminishes, Islamists would think of a accepting a power 
sharing model. Sharing power with very powerful actors does not seem to be a 
proposed solution. Only when a party is equal in power or resources is it able to sit 
around one table with stronger allies. The Lebanese consociational system brings 
actors from all over Lebanon around one table. The thesis links consociationalism or 
power sharing to relative deprivation. It seems that within the current relative 
deprivation, Islamists are unwilling to accept the consociational arrangement. As 
relative deprivation is a major concern for Sunnis in general and for Islamists in 
particular, it becomes vital to diminish the discrepancies prior to any integration. 
Once parties are equal in power, they tend to accept negotiation or discussions. In 
that sense, Islamists and Hezbollah cannot join one table while the former feel that 
they are powerless. Balance of power is essential prior to any discussion of 
integration or cooperation. When Hariri was strong in Tripoli, Islamists did not have 
the luxury of representation. They had to cooperate or remain silent (Abdo, 2013). 
Within the current Sunni anger reservoir, Sunnis might support Islamists and 
recognize them over the mediocre Hariri who has recently been performing poorly. 
Time will tell whether Islamists will develop into the ‘Sunni Hezbollah’ scenario or 
not (Are Salafis Preparing to Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). 
1.6 Significance and statement of need 
  
Within the current rise of radical Islamism in the region, it is of great importance to 
understand factors leading to its growth, in areas such as Northern Lebanon, 
particularly when those groups receive significant sympathy. Sympathy associated 
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with political deprivation may lead to political exclusion and strengthens radicalism. 
This research explores whether social and political equality are prerequisites to 
Islamists’ integration in the Lebanese consociational system. Integration means that 
the existence of those clusters is formalized and therefore their movements are 
observed. Linking relative deprivation to radicalism aims to understand when people 
shift to radical solutions. Understanding this link proclaims that groups reach out for 
violent means when they are relatively deprived. The hypothesis could be tested in 
the region, possibly creating a fair global system and limiting the intensification of 
radicalism, therefore, directly supporting peace actions.  
1.7 Methodology 
 
Data collection will rely on the content of some discourses and speeches made by 
Islamists. Some literature will be used to compare Hezbollah’s rise to the rise of 
Islamists. Furthermore, I will rely on a study conducted on the reasons behind the 
rise of Jihadism in Tripoli. The study questions Tripoli Sunni residents on what they 
think the main reason behind the rise of Jihadi groups. The results assert that relative 
derivation is a major factor behind this rise of radical Islamism. 
This research will predominantly count on qualitative analysis through interviews 
conducted with Islamists leaders and activists from the movement in order to extract 
views toward their own state of affairs, compared to others, and ultimately capture 
comparative different attitudes towards coexistence and power sharing.  Interviews 
with both Salafists and Islamists will question their willingness to be part of the 
Lebanese consociational system. Questions intend to measure to what extent relative 
deprivation is linked to Islamists exclusionary politics. If so, will diminishing relative 
deprivation resolve the conflict? In this regards, interviews will focus on Islamists 
demands and the corresponding strategy orientation. Therefore, the first question will 
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ask about Islamists willingness to join the Lebanese consociational system. As many 
Salafist leaders have been shifting more towards politics, their agenda and major 
demands need to be clarified. Linking this to relative deprivation, Islamists’ input 
about possible solutions to diminish relative deprivation will be further investigated. 
If relative deprivation ends and Islamists are treated fairly according to their 
definition of fairness, will they be looking into being part of the Lebanese 
consociational system? Are they willing to sit aside Hezbollah on the same table? 
In this sense, it is essential to question whether Islamists think the Sunni public mass 
supports them and on what basis. Moreover, questions will provide a comparison 
between Islamists’ current rise and Hezbollah’s earlier experience. Could 
Hezbollah’s model be duplicated? Are Islamists planning to do so? If yes, what are 
the lessons learned and what are the threats that they foresee?  
1.7.1 Research design  
 
This thesis is investigatory research that examines current Islamist strands in 
northern Lebanon and their developments in order to reveal potential pattern towards 
consocialtional politics. The research design will reveal the circumstances under 
which a sectarian exclusionary movement may ultimately yield to consociationalism 
and power sharing political arrangement.  For this study, subsequent chapters include 
a literature review, the methodology, findings and discussions, and a conclusion. The 
literature review will reveal the direct correlation between relative deprivation theory 
and Islamists’ exclusionary politics. Hezbollah will be taken as a case study to 
compare it to the current rise of Salafism. Drawing on many similarities, this chapter 
will question the extent to which Islamists may imitate Hezbollah’s successful 
experience. Hezbollah’s development from an Islamic group to a fully integrated 
group may set an example for Islamists to duplicate. Previous literature will be used 
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to examine Islamists’ status in Tripoli, and their views regarding their own political 
affairs. Relative deprivation as a theory will be examined in this chapter and linked 
to Islamists’ own social and political statuses. By the end of chapter two, the research 
hypothesis will be determined. Chapter one will explain the research methodology. 
The thesis will mainly concentrate on interviews with some Islamist leaders in 
Tripoli. It will introduce key Sunni leaders and present a sample of the interview 
questions that will tackle Islamists’ demands and future prospects. The methodology 
explains what is going to be measured and how. In this regards, relative deprivation 
among Islamists and its direct implication on their exclusionary political discourse 
will be weighed. The study results will be finally presented in chapter four, with an 
in-depth analysis of the provided data. The outcome of the research will either assert 
the hypothesis or defy it. The final chapter sums up the research and concludes the 
study. In this chapter the research significance will be re-emphasized and future 
prospects will be presented. 
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Chapter Two 
 
 
Islamist Integration: Relative Deprivation Theory 
 
Recent years have shown a rise in Islamists movements throughout the Arab region 
including Lebanon. Following the Syrian uprising and the internal political 
fluctuations, Islamists’ power in Tripoli is leaning upwards. Several internal factors 
have facilitated this upsurge. The absence of a Sunni leadership accompanied with 
Hezbollah’s internal strategy and the imbalance of power, exposed Islamists as the 
“possible – new Sunni representatives.” This chapter analyses the rise of Islamists 
and compare that to the rise of Hezbollah in 1985. Contrary to what is thought, both 
parties share common ideologies specifically those that are Islamic-based like the 
concept of Jihad. However, each group differently explicates, orients and justifies 
similar concepts. This section tends to examine Hezbollah’s model and integration 
into the Lebanese state and poses a question to whether Islamists could imitate this 
experience. The study looks at the rise of Islamists from the perspective of relative 
deprivation theory, which affirms that when expectations are higher than 
achievements people tend to reach out to violence (Richardson, 2011). Findings 
assist that the pre-requisite to Islamists’ integration into the Lebanese political 
system is a power balance manifestation.  
2.1 Salafists in Northern Lebanon 
 
In order to better understand Salafism, the term needs to be defined. Salafism calls 
for a return to Islam as practiced by the prophet and his ancestors, which the term 
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“salaf” stands for. Salafists are classified into three main categories: quietists, 
activists and Salafist Jihadists. Quietest groups call for Islam through Islamic 
education, activists are those who are unsatisfied with their current governments and 
call for change in the political representation, whereas the Jihadists are those who 
aim at going back to the golden era of Islam through holy war or Jihad (Rabil, 2015). 
In Lebanon, the Salafist movement was established in 1946 by Salem al Shahal. The 
movement first called Shabab Mohammad and later Al Jama’ah Islamiya (which 
means groups of Muslims); initially focused only on charity work and Da’wa. As 
Salem grew older, his son Da’i took control which marked the second phase of 
Salafists’ work. Instead of merely focusing on the Da’wa, Da’i combined both the 
Da’wa and politics and during the Lebanese civil war, he founded an Islamic Army 
to defend the Sunni people. The Syrian army has quite managed to crack down on 
Salafists in Tripoli in 1985. After the Ta’if agreement in 1989, which ended the 
Lebanese civil war, Al Shahal resumed da’wa work through different means. He 
founded Jam’iyyat Al Hidayya wal Ihsan, which was abolished during the Syrian 
occupation accusing it of encouraging sectarianism. After Syrian withdrawal from 
Lebanon, the group operated again (Abdo, 2015). 
In 2006, Sunnis were afraid that Hezbollah’s victory against Israel would make the 
party even more powerful and grant them control over the Lebanese territories. In 
May 2008, Hezbollah invaded Beirut cities in a reaction to a governmental verdict; 
this incident gave Sunnis credibility to further oppose the party. Due to the absence 
of a strong Sunni leader, Islamist power in Tripoli is growing. Some Islamists are 
being compared to Hezbollah’s occurrence in the 1980s although many Islamist 
group emerged before Hezbollah did. Yet those groups are aware of the inadequate 
number of supporters and their aim seems to transcend the Lebanese territories. 
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While linking the Sunnis abuse in Iraq and Syria to that in Lebanon, Islamists feel 
that they have a call of duty to stop the Sunni bleeding. Social media and the internet 
facilitate the discussion of atrocities from one country to the other (Abdo, 2015). 
In that sense, Islamists feel that Sunnis are being targeted both inside and outside 
Lebanon. Feelings of marginalization and deprivation can be easily detected from the 
twitter account of D’ai al Islam al Shahal. On September 8 2013, he tweets:  “The 
attack on our Sunni people and brothers in Baalbek and their vulnerability at the 
hands of the organization called Hezbollah, a sectarian power whose purpose is to 
create war and sedition… So it is normal for Sunnis of the world not to be quiet on 
the Safavid project targeting the Sunni people in Syria and Lebanon and the area” (as 
cited in Abdo, 2015). 
Islamists are using social media to raise public awareness and influence opinion. 
While media is attentive to radical jihadists, those non-violent Islamists also have a 
role in creating tension and instability. Tripoli Islamists or Da’wa Islamists are more 
often engaging in political affairs. For them, they think that they are being called for 
participation and dragged into the war in Syria and Iraq out of responsibility and duty 
of action (Abdo, 2015). 
There is a wide divide between Shiites and Sunnis in the region. Policymakers are 
questioning whether the reasons behind that conflict are ideological differences or 
socioeconomic. Due to the empowerment of Shiites in Iraq and Lebanon, Sunnis feel 
threatened and Islamists are on the rise. 
2.2 Sunni Islamists vs. Hezbollah 
 
Ever since the assassination of Hariri, Sunnis have been feeling marginalized, 
targeted and unprotected. Several internal incidents has increased these feelings. The 
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collapse of the government in 2008 and Hezbollah’s take over further threatened 
Sunnis presence (Neriah, 2012). Islamists in Tripoli feel that they are being accused 
with fabricated stories. They see themselves as individuals with beliefs and a right to 
share those beliefs. One of them says, “Just like any other party does, Islamists, 
being passionate about their religion, have the right to call for Islam.” The treatment 
Islamists are receiving is leading them to become extremists (Ali, 2014).  
Within the current state of affairs, it seems that the lack of a Sunni leadership is 
giving rise to Islamist’s take over. It remains unclear whether those groups are 
capable of imitating Hezbollah’s experience successfully. In the coming section, I 
present a historical investigation of Hezbollah’s shift from a religious party to a party 
fully integrated in the Lebanese system. Then I compare between Hezbollah and 
Islamists questioning the possibility of having the latter imitate Hezbollah’s earlier 
successful experience.  
2.2.1 Hezbollah: from Islamism to Integration 
 
Hezbollah, or the part of God, was created in 1982 as an anti-colonialism party 
fighting the Israeli occupation. Ideologically the party derives its beliefs form the 
Iranian ideology of Wilayat Al Fakih , or rule of Jurisprudent. The roots of their 
Islamic ideology is based on the concept of Jihadism, which is the willingness to die 
while fighting for something for the sake of God. Hezbollah’s political ideology is 
mainly concentrated on Israeli resistance. The party strongly believes in fighting the 
oppressors in general in addition to the unity of Muslims and Jihadism. Since its 
emergence up till early 1990s, Hezbollah has presented itself as an Islamic group 
calling for an Islamic state. In 1991, the party shifted towards more openness and 
inclusive policy following the election of Abaas Al Musawi. This openness or 
“Infitah” was illustrated by initiating a dialogue with Christians, and offering 
  
 
24 
 
services to both Muslims and non- Muslims. While the shift from an Islamic Jihadist 
organization to an integrated and open political party seems extraordinary, it was 
clear that Hezbollah’s new orientation focuses more on Lebanonization (Agha, n.d.). 
2.2.2 Hezbollah and Islamists Similarities  
 
On the concept of Jihadism, Hezbollah and Islamists share a common ground.  
Hezbollah believes that Jihadism has two ultimate goals. The first is martyrdom and 
the second is the victory of the Umma. While the Umma differs in definition, both 
parties think that Jihadism is a religious duty in order to protect rights. The rights for 
Hezbollah are illustrated in land. The party practices martyrdom against Israelis. 
Jihadism against Israel, being an aggressive occupant, in that sense is justified. For 
Hezbollah bowing oneself receives over value and glory as this preserves the dignity 
of the Umma. It is a matter of choosing to live humiliated in the world or die and live 
eternally in heaven while preserving the Umma honour (Agha, n,d). 
When it comes to preserving the Umma honour and protecting rights Sunni Islamists 
seem to share the same ideology. Jihad orientation though differs widely between the 
two groups. It is clear from what is spread on social media and from the research 
done that Islamists regard Hezbollah as one of the enemies especially after the 
latter’s participation in the Syrian civil war alongside the regime. Islamists 
sometimes go overboard, calling for Jihad against the Shiites, or as they call them 
“Rawafid.”   
In short, since the 1990s Hezbollah has been gradually evolving into a major player 
in the Lebanese consociational politics, offering services to both Muslims and 
Christians and participating in parliamentary, municipal, and governmental work. 
Through participating in the parliament, Hezbollah’s voice becomes formally heard 
both locally and internationally.  It is clear that following the Ta’if agreement and the 
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end of civil war, Hezbollah shifted from marginalization towards “infitah”, and from 
Islamization to “Lebanonization”, the subject matter that shaped its political 
discourse and priorities (Agha, n.d). 
As mentioned before, one of the most important political ideologies for Hezbollah is 
the concept of the oppressed and oppressors. In Arabic, oppressed are called al 
mustad‘afin or those who are deemed weak; and the oppressors or the arrogant are 
called in Arabic Mustakbirin. Fadlallah had a religious theory of oppression where 
colonialism, imperialism and Zionism are regarded as evils and deserve to be 
attacked by the oppressed. According to Fadlallah, oppression steals from people the 
liberty granted to them by God. This leads to dehumanization and emerges feelings 
of helplessness and deprivation. The Quran urges the oppressed to revolt against 
those who are oppressing them, in order to preserve political and social justice. In 
that sense, Sunni Islamists and Hezbollah consent. At one point, Shiites themselves 
were deprived groups.  Similarly, Sunni Islamists or Salafists tackle the issue of 
deprivation and dehumanization in almost every speech or discourse. 
Locally Hezbollah’s program is to protect the oppressed, socially and politically. 
Internationally, its program is forged to offend oppressors, the US for the support of 
Israel and the west for their intention to conquer the Middle East (Agha, n.d).  
The concept of the oppressed is a very common one to Islamists. They have used this 
terminology to describe their current status for so long. According to them 
oppression is best illustrated through the bitter relation they share with the Lebanese 
security forces. This is tied to the arrests and prosecution of Islamist members. In this 
regards, Islamists have expressed their discontent from the fact that they are used to 
scare people during critical political conflicts, and after things settle down, they pay 
the price alone (Ali, 2014). 
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2.2.3 Islamists replicating Hezbollah’s model 
 
An article published in Karl Remarks indicates that Salafists cannot replicate 
Hezbollah’s model due to several reasons (Are Salafis Preparing to Replicate 
Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 2012). First, Hezbollah’s military capabilities 
are accumulated over years through fighting against Israel and wasn’t built 
overnight. Second, Hezbollah targets transnational states and not internal sectarian 
communities. Its agenda is fighting Israel and oppressors rather than carrying out 
sectarian divisions. When it does so it becomes a weakened party. Third, Hezbollah 
choses its battles carefully and intervenes only when gains are higher than costs. 
Fourth, Hezbollah shares the government with the Sunni business class who 
administer economic and administrative errands. If Islamists join the political 
consociational system, the role of the Sunni Business class will be diminished. 
Therefore it seems obvious that the first and foremost pre-requisite to indulging 
Islamists in the Lebanese consociational system is that the Sunni leadership needs to 
stay vacant (Are Salafis Preparing to Replicate Hezbollah Model in North Lebanon, 
2012). Having this pre-requisite, the willingness of Islamists to join the 
consociational system needs to be questioned as well. It is clear that with the 
Salafists being relatively deprived in comparison to Hezbollah, integration seems 
difficult. In the following section, relative deprivation will be explored. The study 
proposes that only when relative deprivation diminishes, Islamists could possible 
accept a power sharing arrangement.  
2.3 Tripoli Islamists views on political participation  
 
Sunni Islamic movements in Tripoli have been divided among those who want to 
participate in the Lebanese system and those who reject being part of it. In this 
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section the extent to which Islamists involvement in the political life will be 
measured through looking into each Islamic party and their corresponding political 
discourse. 
2.3.1 The Islamic Group or Al Jama’ah Islamiah 
 
The Islamic group is a major Sunni Islamist movement in Lebanon. It originated 
from another group named “God Worshipers.”  The group’s licensed founders are 
Fathi Yakan, Sheikh Faisal Mawlawi, Zuhair al-Obeidi and Ibrahim al-Masri. The 
"Islamic Group" in Lebanon is the first political Islamic movement that receives its 
license form a leftist and secular leader who was the interior minister at that time 
(Imad, n.d.). 
Al Jama’ah Islamiah, has already participated in elections in the era of the Syrian 
presence, and their support voices did not exceed five thousand votes. While Al 
Tawhid Movement represented by Sheikh Bilal Shaaban, won seventeen thousand 
voices. This was an evidence that the majority of Sunnis in Tripoli tend to the 
support moderation rather than Islamism. It remains vague whether the current 
support reflects the same (Al Jama’ah Al Islamiya, n.d.). 
2.3.2 Islamic Tawhid movement 
 
 Al Tawhid movement was founded in 1982 as a coalition between various small 
Islamic groups in Tripoli. Sheikh Sa’eed Shaaban was elected as the party prince. 
Even though the movement initially wanted to unite the Islamic movements, they 
have failed in doing so. After the death of Sheikh Shaaban, the movement split into 
two groups. The first group under the leadership of Sheikh Bilal Shaaban, Sa’eed’s 
son, and the second led by Hashim Minqara ,after his release from Syrian prisons. It 
supported the candidates of Jama’ah Al Islamiya in the parliamentary elections. The 
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movement has participated in the municipal elections in Tripoli, yet after Hariri’s 
assassination the group has lost much of its supporters in the Sunni public mass 
(Imad, n.d.). 
2.3.3 Liberation Party or Hezb Al Tahreer  
 
Hezb Al Tehreer was established in the 1950s. The party’s main aim is to establish 
an Islamic state that governs all state affairs according to what God implies. The 
party considers Lebanon a annexation of the West ideology. For them, Lebanon does 
not fit for an Islamic state, but the Lebanese problem will only be solved by annexing 
Lebanon to Syria. The party rejects democracy and the resulting institutions. They 
have received their formal license in 2006 from the Interior Minister Ahmad Fatfat, 
after which the party resolved to public work. The party considers the Lebanese 
regulations that apply as “Kofr” systems. They do not look into being part of the 
Lebanese system because neither do they participate in the rule of disbelief, nor by 
using force or weapons to change (Imad, n.d.). 
2.3.4 Salafists 
 
In Lebanon today there are two types of such Salafists. The first are the Salafist 
Wahhabis and the second are Salafists -Jihadists. The Salafist Wahabis are interested 
in preaching and Islamic education and they do not have a specific structure. Those 
are not interested in politics but in the general interests of the Muslims. The Salafist 
Wahabis are divided among themselves between those who are deferring the 
participation in the Lebanese system or the “Lebanonization” process and those who 
are verbally dismissive of any participation in the political life through elections or 
other systems of disbelief. The Salafist Jihadists consider all the contemporary 
societies as ignorant and therefore should be resisted through armed Jihad.  
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Although there are differences among different Islamists in Lebanon, it seems that 
they are more involved in the political life, and their participation in parliamentary 
elections is counted as an important step towards” Lebanonization” across the 
Lebanese democratic mechanisms. However, engaging in the political life did not 
include all the Islamic organizations, but it happened variously between them. What 
applies to the Islamic group Hezbollah does not apply to Hizb al-Tahrir, or the 
Salafists for example. Assessing the role of those groups in a diverse society like 
Lebanon needs continuous surveillance (Imad, n.d.). 
In Tripoli Islamic groups are not united towards one goal. Their political views 
regarding participation in the Lebanese consocitaional system are clearly dispersed 
and fragmented. For some Islamists, each situation has its own status and special 
interests. Fatwas on the political participation are therefore released according to 
varying circumstances (Nafe’, 2013).  
2.4 Relative deprivation and Islamist integration 
 
Some political and social analysts has referred to feelings of deprivation through the 
relative deprivation theory. According to this theory, the discrepancy between what a 
person deserves and what they think they can actually achieve leads to violence.  
Gurr in his book, “Why men Rebel”, tries to explain why people join radical 
movements. He links violence to frustration and aggression. People tend to use 
violence when they are frustrated and they are often frustrated because they feel 
deprived of a right. When frustration becomes prolonged, it leads to aggression 
(Gurr, 1970). According to Salafist Sheikh Nouredine Ghalayini, Hezbollah had been 
“shedding the blood of Muslims” since 2000 and “we feel that we usually and 
inevitably will pay the price of this injustice because we support the Syrian people so 
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long as our religion calls for defending the weak and the oppressed before an unjust 
ruler.” Ghalayini among others, regards Hezbollah’s fighting in Syria as a war 
against Sunnis (Ali, 2014, p. 4). This triggers feelings of frustration which most of 
the times leads to violence. Moreover, feelings of frustration are often linked to 
hatred. Some Islamists are being very open about their animosity towards Shiites 
whom according to them, disguise themselves under religious beliefs. For those 
Islamists, dialogue does not seem to bring any positive change (Ali, 2014). 
Following the leakage of a video showing torture of Roumieh prisoners, Sheikh 
Salem Rafeii, a member of the Muslim Scholars Association, said that the Sunni sect 
has been oppressed for so long in Lebanon. In this regards, The Muslim Scholars 
have demanded a federal system, threatening that what is happening in Syria can 
happen in Lebanon as a result of injustice. For Salafists, federalism is not the end 
objective rather it is the normal result of the continuous aggression against the Sunni 
people. The Muslim scholars have continuously been speaking about "the sufferings 
of the Sunni people” in Lebanon and the region (Astih, 2015). It seems that this 
relative deprivation is leading Salafists to detach themselves from the government 
and seek private governance. 
In the MENA region Islamists are feeling deprived and dominated by the west. 
Dominance is mainly revealed through cultural takeover. Salafist-Jihadists are trying 
to re-establish their culture and denounce western dominance. “People frequently 
mobilize in reaction to threats…” Hansen, n.d., p. 2). Individuals are mobilized when 
there basic rights and values are threatened. Islamic activism arises due to injustice. 
It is an outcome of both internal and external threats. Once opportunities become 
available, this activism turns into mobilization (Hansen, n.d). 
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In most times, discrimination leads to frustration and frustrated Muslims are more 
inclined to join radical movements. When feeling marginalized or discriminated 
against, groups become receptive to radical ideologies in order to change. Many 
individuals only became terrorists or radicals after an important loss, or feelings of 
deprivation, despotism or alienation. Defining themselves as victims or unjustly 
treated it becomes easy to radicalize them (Whitehair, 2012). 
A survey conducted by the 1990 Trust during 2006 found that 81% of the 1,213 
Muslims who answered the survey perceived the 'War on Terror' to be a war on 
Muslims (Whitehair, 2012). Boeker’s labelling theory best illustrates this. The theory 
implies that when individuals are defined to act in a certain way, they tend to act 
according to how they were labelled (Whitehair, 2012). This makes individuals or 
Muslim communities attracted to radical groups that offer them the house of safety, 
and a sense of belonging. Studies have showed that terrorists tend to come from 
highly educated and wealthy families. Yet many of them are unemployed. This 
discrepancy between what they have, in terms of skills and education, and what is 
offered to them, in terms of employment, leads to dissatisfaction, frustration and 
feelings of deprivation. Relative deprivation occurs when individuals or groups 
esubjectively perceive themselves as unfairly disadvantaged over others who are 
perceived to have similar attributes and be deserving of similar rewards (Gurr, 
1970).Yet this theory does not explain why parts of the same deprived groups refrain 
from joining terrorist movements.  Becoming a terrorist involves something more. 
However, conjointly, the primary research coupled with the earlier findings, has 
portrayed discrimination as an influential factor for motivating Muslims to join an 
extremist network (Whitehair, 2012). 
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The reason behind Muslims’ joining ISIS is being forthly investigated. Some argue 
that ideology and culture are the main motives, while others think that it is the 
aftermath of lack of education and socio-economic factors. Instead, relative 
deprivation seems to offer a better explanation. The growing gap between 
expectations and opportunities leads to ideological radicalization. "Those who are 
educated and with high ambitions but no real prospects for advancement are the 
'frustrated achievers' increasingly tempted by radicalism"(Taspinar, 2015, p. 1). 
Rising inequality and growing awareness about it go hand in hand. Gurr (1977) 
explains that instead of an absolute standard of deprivation, a gap between expected 
and achieved welfare creates collective discontent. Political violence is the outcome 
of collective discontent. 
Globalization and the access to media is increasing feelings of deprivation and 
frustration. People tend to see what others are receiving worldwide and compare their 
resources. Therefore there is an increased awareness of one’s relative standing in 
compare to others (Richardson, 2011). Some studies link low level employment to 
opportunities received. This reflects the hypothesis that individuals who obtain a 
higher education are more likely to feel a greater sense of deprivation from 
unemployment than those who did not necessarily expect to find work. 
Analyzing the above, relative deprivation seems to offer a solid explanation of why 
Islamists are resolving to exclusionary politics. For them, several incidents triggered 
their anger. They have voiced out their extreme discontent about detaining their 
Islamists without charges for years. The absolute power Hezbollah enjoys in the 
country, and their intervention in the Syrian war against Sunni rebels generated 
frustration. In general, Islamists feel that they are attacked and targeted. In many of 
their discourses they refer to discrimination and feelings of deprivation. In many 
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cases they have been opposing the Lebanese armed forces for what they see as the 
law being applied solely on them. This is what makes them hesitant towards the 
current Lebanese system, which they view as being unfair. Therefore having them 
part of the Lebanese consociational arrangement becomes valid only when they are 
treated equally. Otherwise while they perceive themselves as unjustly treated, they 
will only detach themselves from the Lebanese system more and more. 
  
  
 
34 
 
 
 
Chapter Three 
 
 
Methodology 
 
This chapter explains and justifies the choice of the applied research methods. It will 
clarify the research design, the chosen sample, the procedures used, and the ethical 
contemplations. In this chapter a section about the research limitation will also be 
available. At the time being, it seems unclear whether Islamists in Tripoli are willing 
to join the Lebanese political system or not. This thesis intends to question this 
component first. It will then measure whether participation is linked to the relative 
deprivation theory. In that sense, would relative deprivation that Islamists 
continuously speak of, limit their choice of participating in the Lebanese 
consociational system, and will diminishing that be a pre-condition for their 
participation? 
3.1 Research design  
 
This research is an investigatory research that examines past radical Islamist groups 
and their developments with the current groupings in order to reveal potential pattern 
toward consociational politics.  The research design reveals the circumstances under 
which a sectarian exclusionary movement may ultimately yield to consociationalism 
and a power sharing political arrangement. Primary empirical research is chosen in 
order to reveal Islamists’ future prospects.  The research addresses a central question 
of whether Islamists have visions of joining the Lebanese political system or not. 
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Looking into the available literature, it is clear that there is no consistency in the 
resources. This demonstrated that a qualitative methodology is the best option 
towards a better understanding of the current situation. The chosen approach takes 
into consideration the Moreover, this thesis will rely on a study conducted in Tripoli 
on the reasons behind the rise of Jihadism. The study called “Radical Islamic 
movements in Tripoli: The Relative Deprivation Theory”, was conducted in 2014. It 
questioned what Tripoli residents think the reasons behind the rise of extremists are. 
Results asserted that relative derivation is a major factor behind this rise (Barakeh, 
2014). 
3.2 Methodology  
 
Information collection will rely on the content of some discourses and speeches 
made by Islamists and other political actors. Previous research done on Tripoli 
Sunnis will be considered in the research as an introduction to the political status. 
Furthermore, some literature will be used to compare Hezbollah’s rise to the rise of 
Islamists. This research will predominantly count on qualitative analysis through 
interviews conducted with Islamists leaders and activists from the movement in order 
to extract views toward their own state of affairs, compared to others, and ultimately 
capture comparative different attitude toward coexistence and power sharing. 
Interviews with Islamists will question their willingness to be part of the Lebanese 
consociational system. Questions intended to measure to what extent relative 
deprivation is linked to Islamists exclusionary politics. If so, will diminishing relative 
deprivation yield to their participation? In this regards, interviews focused on 
Islamists demands and their corresponding strategy orientation.  
The research study uses individual in-depth semi-structured interviews. This method 
seems to be the most suitable in order to delve into Islamists thoughts and ideas. The 
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interviews used provided the research with qualitative, detailed and specific answers 
to the questions. It has been well known that whenever a research aims to have a full 
sight into people’s views, interviews act as the best methodology to achieve so. Yet 
one drawback of the interviews is that sometimes it limits the opinions available for 
the researcher (Whitehair, 2012). In this research, this drawback does not count 
because I have chosen four different participants and their opinions are taken into 
consideration. The best way to conduct this research was through this methodology 
as the topic is very religious and political, thus very sensitive. Interviews were 
chosen over questionnaires because people communication and interaction always 
adds a source of relief to the interviewee and gives him/her a sense of human 
cooperation (Whitehair, 2012). As mentioned before, a small part of this research 
will rely on a previous study done in Tripoli, which is a survey study. 
3.2.1 Sample Interview Questions  
 
A series of nine questions related to the themes discussed in the literature review 
were drafted as in Table 1. 
 
 
Table 1: Questions to Islamists on relative deprivation and consociationalism 
1 As an Islamic group, are you willing to join the Lebanese consociational 
system? 
 
2 What is your agenda and what are your major demands? 
 
3 In your speeches you refer to Sunni deprivation quite often, how do you 
think this can be resolved?  
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4 If relative deprivation ends and Islamists are treated fairly according to 
your definition of fairness, will you be looking into being part of the 
Lebanese consociational system? Are you willing to sit aside Hezbollah 
on the same table? 
5 Do you think Sunnis in Tripoli support being represented by an Islamic 
group rather than a mediocre party like Hariri? 
6 Having Islamic background and ideologies, do you compare your rise to 
that of Hezbollah’s?  
7 Are you looking to duplicating Hezbollah’s rise in Lebanon? 
8 If any, what are the lessons learned from Hezbollah that you will use in 
your future plan? 
9 What kind of threats do you forsee? 
 
Questions discussed Islamists’ participation in the Lebanese conscociational system, 
relative deprivation and Islamists resemblance to Hezbollah.  
Some questions have led to more discussions while others had clear cut answers. In 
order to guarantee security and confidentiality, interviews were not recorded, I was 
taking notes of the answers provided. The interviews took place in Islamists’ private 
places. The discussions allowed for interactions on the subject in order to grasp ideas 
about Islamists’ own political discourse. When discussions took a different direction 
I tried to bring the subject back to the point of interest to focus on relative 
deprivation rather than political views regarding Hezbollah. That was pretty 
challenging as the subject is very sensitive to Islamists and it got very personal when 
Hezbollah comes into discussion. That’s why I had to take out the Hezbollah’s part 
of questions when those seemed to cause tensions. Through interviews, I wanted to 
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know more about Islamists’ views on relative deprivation. Interviews gave the 
opportunity for interviewees to discuss things they do not normally want to discuss 
anywhere else (Whitehair, 2012). In order to start this research I arranged a meeting 
with one of the prominent Sheikhs in Dar Al Fatwa. He gave me some information 
on who to approach and guided my research’s first steps. He was very helpful to 
provide me with some Islamists’ phone numbers, some of which did not collaborate 
at all. The questions in table 1 are drafted in a way that allowed discussions and more 
interaction while measuring relative deprivation.  
 
As mentioned earlier, a small part of the thesis relies on a study that involved 
quantitative methodology. The study links relative deprivation in Tripoli to the rise 
of Islamists in the city. In an attempt to answer why Tripoli has observed lately an 
increase in Islamism, a survey was distributed among Tripoli residents to question 
what their views on the reasons behind the rise of Islamists are. The in-depth 
questionnaires provided the study with concrete details and practical examples of the 
opinions of Tripoli residents and helped in perceiving reality on the ground.  In 
addition to the literature review present on the topic, the survey tried to answer why 
the number of Islamic groups has enormously rose lately in Tripoli. The 
questionnaire was a simple one composed of only three questions. See table 2.  
Table 2: Questions for Tripoli residents on the rise of Islamism 
1. 1 2. What do you think is the main reason behind the rise of Islamism in 
Tripoli? 
3. a. Socio-economic  b. Psychological c. Political d. Religious e. to protect 
oneself f. more than one reason 
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4. 2 5. If your answer to question 1 was f, how much percentage you give to the 
closest option you chose? 
__________________________________________________ 
6. 3 7. Explain. 
 
 
The questions were direct and simple, “what do you think the major reason behind 
the rise of Islamic movements in Tripoli?” This answer had five options, a. Socio 
economic reasons, b. Psychological reasons c. Political reasons d. Religious reasons 
e. to protect oneself. The first five options were direct yet limiting the options to only 
one answer. This is why a 6th option was added and that was option f., “more than 
one answer.” If the answer to question 1 was f, the second question requests the 
highest percentage to the preferred choice. Therefore when the participants perceived 
that more than one factor play a role in the rise of Islamism what factor plays a 
higher role? The third and last question was to explain the choice. The results were 
as expected, relative deprivation seems to be the reason behind the rise in Islamism 
in Tripoli (Barakeh, 2014).  
3.3 Sampling 
 
The sample studied were Islamists who speak of relative deprivation, those who 
continuously refer to deprivation in their public discourses. The sample size was four 
Islamists, who clearly reflected relative deprivation in their speeches. My aim was to 
check whether those Islamists wanted to join the Lebanese political system in the 
first place and if not whether relative deprivation stands behind that abstain. 
Therefore will diminishing relative deprivation affect Islamists’ decision of political 
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participation. The sample chosen was fair yet not outstanding. In fact one of the 
research limitation that is presented below is related to the sample studied. The 
intention was to interview eight Islamists of which I was able to reach only four. It is 
clear that when the research subject is sensitive the sample choice gets difficult. Even 
though the sample was relatively small being from the same culture limited any 
“interview bias” (Whitehair, 2012). 
 
In regards to the study done with Tripoli residents, a total of 60 Lebanese accepted to 
participate in the study. The sample chosen was from poor areas in Tripoli, 
Tebbeneh, Kobbeh and Abi Samra. Those cities have been very well known for 
hosting many Islamists.  The number of participants varied from one area to another. 
50% of participants were from Tebbenh and 25% from both Kobbeh and Abi Samra. 
The reason behind the dispersion is because Tebbeneh hosts the greater number of 
Islamists. Those Islamists practice more violent actions mainly during the clashes 
that has been occasionally happening between Tebbeneh and Jabal Mohsen- the 
Alawite majority area for the past years. 
3.4 Procedure 
 
Arranging interviews was not an easy task. I had to rely on personal connections to 
reach out for Islamists’ numbers and to convince them that I am a normal student 
undergoing research. The assistance of some of my personal networks were used in 
order to help me in introducing myself. Assuring Islamists that this research is just a 
research with no political backlashes was the most challenging part of the research. 
Therefore, it took me some time before being able to see any of the Islamists. 
Although some Islamists have been very hesitant to participate in this research, 
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others have been very welcoming and helpful, according to them they “had nothing 
to hide.”  
 
Following the project introduction on the phone and interviewees oral consent, 
interviews were finally arranged. The interviewees were provided with the approved 
consent from the Institutional Review Board (IRB), see appendix A. The consent has 
a brief introduction about the project aim and the method used. After handling in a 
copy for those, the interview proceeded. The answers were documented in detail. At 
moments, some interviewees provided me with very confidential details, but I could 
not use that information in my study because they asked me not to include that 
information. During such incidents, I had to reiterate that all names will be kept 
confidential, but again some insisted that even though they do not want such 
information to be published, and therefore of course I had to leave those pieces of 
information out. The main research question was to check whether Islamists are 
willing to join the Lebanese consocitaional system. This is how the questions started, 
opening up a space for many discussions and sometimes directly deriving answers to 
coming questions. 
3.5 Ethics   
 
A main aspect of this study revolves around integrity and research ethics. As 
mentioned earlier, the topic discussed is a sensitive one. Furthermore, at the moment 
there seems to be many people linking all Islamists to ISIS or wrongly connecting 
their ideologies. This is why very strict ethical guidelines were incorporated in this 
thesis. Informed consent was the first step prior to any research. The information 
sheets given to interviewees informed them about the research goals and their rights 
as participants. It was clearly stated that participants have the right to refrain from 
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answering any question and the right to withdraw from the project at any time. This 
complies with the “do no harm” strategy. The research maintained confidentiality of 
names and information. The names of the participants were not mentioned, rather 
false names were given to the interviewees. In that way confidentiality was 
guaranteed. However, even when no names were mentioned confidential information 
were closed at the discretion of the interviewees. During the interviews the 
participants were promised to maintain confidentiality and as this research entails no 
deception, everything that was promised was complied with. 
3.6 Limitations 
 
Just as any research this thesis had some limitations. Noticeably, one of the major 
limitations is that some of the Islamists whom I wanted to interview were not 
available. Some of which were out of the country due to security reasons, and some 
of which refrained from participation due to the same reason. I wanted to employ a 
bigger sample in the research but this was restricted due to several reasons. In this 
regards, some Islamists did not feel at ease when they saw the interview questions. 
Although they showed respect and trust to the study and its objective, they refrained 
from answering those questions as that may have negative implications on them. 
Explaining that names will not be mentioned did not change much, still some 
Islamists felt threatened. 
Another limitation was that during the interviews some Islamists were disclosing 
information that are opposite to what is available in some of the literature. It was 
challenging though to discover whether the information provided was truthful or not. 
In that sense, I had to restate my question referring to previous speeches done by 
those Islamists. Similarly some Islamists were not very direct in answering the 
questions. They preferred not to state their opinion directly, rather they were 
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indirectly stating them while speaking on behalf of all Islamists. Referring to one’s 
opinions on behalf of many Islamists made the data analysis more challenging. In the 
coming chapter the data will be available for discussion. 
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Chapter Four 
 
 
 Relative deprivation reinforces Islamists’ 
exclusionary approach 
 
In this chapter, the findings will be presented using an in-depth analysis approach. As 
previously mentioned, the study requires a pre-set condition which is having a vacant 
Sunni leadership.  It relies on the fact that the there is a gap in the current Sunni 
representation and questions the willingness of Islamists to fill this gap. Islamists and 
mediocre parties compete on the same Sunni base. Therefore, this study intends to 
question whether Islamists are looking to become the new Sunni representatives and 
links that to the concept of relative deprivation. Does relative deprivation play a role 
in Islamists’ exclusionary politics? In this regards, if relative deprivation diminishes, 
will Islamists look into being part of the Lebanese consociational structure and 
replicate Hezbollah’s earlier successful experience and gets integrated into the 
Lebanese consociational system?  
4.1 Radical Islamic movements in Tripoli: The Relative Deprivation 
Theory 
Counting on the Sunni base, this thesis briefly relies on a study done with Tripoli 
residents on what they think the main reasons behind the rise of extremism in the city 
are. Surveys were distributed among 60 Tripolitaians, and questions asked targeted 
their views on the main reasons behind the rise of extremism. The results as shown in 
figure 1 and 2 were as expected. People in Tripoli tend to join Islamic movements 
because they feel that they are unprotected. Relative power deprivation in 
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comparison to what other groups in the country possess is the reason many Sunnis in 
the poor northern areas chose the radical path.  
 
 
 
Figure 1: Tripoli residents’ answers on the reasons behind the rise of radical 
Islamism 
 
 
Figure 2: Percentages given to different answers on the rise of radical Islamism in 
Tripoli 
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Out of 60 participants surveyed in Tripoli, 12 saw that the socio-economic reasons 
are behind the rise of Islamism in Tripoli. One of the interviewees said, “Tripoli is 
the city of poverty, people here do not have jobs, and they are sitting all day simply 
doing nothing at all. What do you expect out of people who do not have anything to 
do? Of course they will join such movements; poverty destroys everything.”  
9 out of 60 participants saw that there are religious factors behind this rise. Those 
saw that Muslims should join Islamic movements because they speak in the name of 
God. One of them said, “It is a duty that those movements increase in Tripoli because 
Tripoli is well known for being a religious city, and we all need to be part of Islamic 
movements to protect our city and our religion from any invasion of outsiders and of 
those who hate Sunnis.” Analyzing those who gave religious reasons as answers, one 
can see that there is a small component that calls for protecting oneself from others. 
4 out of the 60 participants saw that political reasons stand behind the rise of radical 
Islamism in Tripoli. Those 4 mainly resided in Tebbeneh area. This is of course due 
to the political component of the clashes between Jabal Mohsen and Tebbeneh. 
Residents of Tebbeneh see that they should join those movements because of the war 
that Syria is launching on their area by Alawaites in Jabal Mohsen. Again this means 
that those residents need to protect themselves and hence the relative deprivation 
theory is popping up more often. 
18 out of 60 participants saw that protecting oneself is the reason behind the rise of 
Islamism in Tripoli.  One of the respondents in Tebbeneh said, “It is a normal 
reaction when people feel inferior or weak. Look around you, Hezbollah’s power has 
invaded our cities and our religion, do you think when we see what has previously 
happened and how relatively weak we are that we will stay silent? Of course we will 
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join Islamic groups to defend ourselves and to take our rights in our hands” 
(Barakeh, 2014).  
16 out of 60 participants saw that more than one reason stand behind the rise of 
Islamic radicalism in Tripoli. Therefore, question 2 in the survey 2 checks what factor 
seems to offer a better reasoning behind the rise. The surveyed then ordered their 
choices. The results reinforced the results of question 1, the highest percentage was 
to protect oneself as seen in figure 3. 
  
 
Figure 3: Percentages of the closest factor when the answer to question 1 involved 
more than one reason behind the rise of Islamism 
 
The study shows that the majority of Tripolitanians see that there is a need to protect 
oneself against other powerful groups in the country. This means that those residents 
feel that they are unprotected and power-inferior, and hence the need to join such 
movements comes from the fact that they are feeling the presence of injustice. It was 
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obvious that within most answers negativity was present. When discussing political, 
or religious reasons; for instance, there has been always a part that stresses on the 
need to join Islamic movements because of inferiority feelings and the real need to 
protect the Umma (Barakeh, 2014). 
 
4.2 Interviews’ Findings 
 
The dissertation’s chief emphasis links Islamists’ exclusionary politics to relative 
deprivation. It addresses the central research question: “Are Tripoli Islamists willing 
to join the Lebanese consociational system and how does that relate to relative 
deprivation?” Findings are divided among three main themes. The first is Islamists’ 
political participation, the second is the concept of relative deprivation and the third 
is resemblance to Hezbollah’s model. 
4.2.1 Theme 1: Political Participation in the consociational system  
Within the escalation of events in the region and the varying political discourses, it 
seems unclear whether Islamists at the moment are willing to be part of the Lebanese 
consociational system. Therefore, it was essential to reach those Islamists and know 
from them directly whether their views had changed with the change of 
circumstances especially after the Syrian Civil War. Political participation has been a 
controversy issue within the available discourses. Some Islamists had shown interest 
in being part of the Lebanese consociational system through participating in the 
electoral system several times. Al Shahal for instance nominated himself twice to the 
elections. Likewise, Al Jama’ah Islamiah clearly do not mind being part of the 
system. Although many Salafists focus on Da’wa, at the moment the majority of 
those are actively taking part in the Lebanese and regional politics. This reflects in 
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their political discourse and their opinion regarding the war in Syria. Within this 
ambiguity it was essential to check what Islamists are determined to do. In that sense 
interviews were structured to measure Islamists’ views on political participation and 
relative deprivation. The results are presented below. Three out of four Islamists are 
not willing to participate in the Lebanese consociational system. See Figure 4. 
 
Figure 4: Islamists’ willingness to participate in the Lebanese consociational system 
 
The reasons behind this abstain focused around one aspect; justice. In fact all 
Islamists strive to have an Islamic rule in the country and that’s why some of them 
do not see the need of participating in this system. Yet when asked why they call for 
Islamic rule, all of them answered that the only fair system is the rule of God directly 
referring to the sufferings they are currently facing in the country. According to one 
of them “It is worth mentioning here that most Islamists and Salafists within 
Lebanon in general and Tripoli in specific aim at establishing Islamic governance. 
We all look at applying Islamic law because it is the law of justice. The war on 
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difference is that we are not allowed to call for our beliefs.” Islamists see that they do 
not have any freedom of expression just as any other group does. Thus, it is true that 
many of them call for Islamic rule, yet this need comes from the fact that they see no 
rule allows their freedom of expression except the Islamic one. The question here 
would be whether they would still call for an Islamic rule if their rights are granted 
equally and they are treated as they would like to be treated. In other words Islamists 
do not want to participate in the current political system mainly due to Islamic 
beliefs. Those beliefs arise from the thought that the rule of God is the only rule that 
will guarantee justice and equality. Within the current imbalance of power, Islamists 
are getting more and more convinced that exclusion is the best way to deal with the 
current unfairness. In that sense relative deprivation is a reinforcing factor worsening 
detachment and deteriorating cooperation. 
One of the Islamists, referred to as Sheikh Ahmad3 , who is a member of the Muslim 
scholars in Tripoli and a student of the Salafist movement leader in Tripoli Sheikh 
Da’ii Al Shahal, sees that their political participation depends on the benefits and 
consequences. Participation is looked at through a wise analysis and vision, and 
accordingly a decision is made of whether this participation will provide any benefit 
to Islamists or not. If participation provides benefits then there is no problem in it; 
yet, if it does not bring any benefit then there is no need for it. While answering this, 
Sheikh Ahmad reflected that they do not see any benefit if they participate in the 
Lebanese system especially with the presence of Hezbollah as it will be mainly the 
participation of the weak alongside the strong. He mentions “We see that there is a 
huge despotism. Hezbollah has enormous power and huge military abilities. 
Whatever Hezbollah wants gets and whatever they do not want does not happen. In 
                                                          
3 This is a given name and not his real name 
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politics participating alongside Hezbollah is the participation of the weak alongside 
the super power. And hence no balance of power will be attainable. The only one 
who will benefit from this participation is Hezbollah itself and will benefit from us 
similarly.” This is a clear demonstration of how relative deprivation leads to 
exclusionary politics.  
Sheikh Ahmad adds, “The current political structure does not allow participation as 
Islamists are scattered and weak. I will speak on behalf of all the Islamists. The 
Islamic groups are not united and they do not agree on one path. Some are with the 
political participation and some are against. Some parties have taken the negative 
side, some do not participate in any formation based on secularism or “Kofr4” 
systems. Political participation does not seem to be serious. In 1992, some Islamic 
groups have supported Islamists in their elections, for example Al Jama’ah Islamiah 
had three members reaching the parliament. Islamists are scattered on all levels, 
politically, religiously, in the Tripoli incidents, and in their opinions. Yet they all 
share the same feelings of mistrust towards this government.” He states, “If the 
Lebanese government is cautious about everyone’s participation then it should grow 
trust in the citizens; in order to participate, I should feel that I am supported.” It is 
clear for Sheikh Ahmad that when relative deprivation diminishes he does not mind 
participating in the Lebanese system. He says, “We see that projects in Tripoli are 
executed by foreigners. They benefit from the city’s resources while Tripoli residents 
do not benefit. We don’t see this in any other place. How can I participate when the 
government is dealing with me in a negative way?”   
                                                          
4 Kofr in English is disbelieve. As an Islamic term, Kofr is referred to those who are do not believe in 
Islamic rules 
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Another prominent Salafist, referred to as sheikh Said, who is the head of Muslim 
Scholars movement in Tripoli and one of the leading Salafists figures in Lebanon, 
does not mind participating in the Lebanese system. He sees that in the current 
situation participation is to assist in lessening deprivation and despotism. Sheikh Said 
says, “We look for the state of faith; if this is not possible, then we request the state 
of justice. Those who look for an Islamic state look for a fair state. We do not look 
for participation, it is not our ambition, but we want to participate to help in 
diminishing the despotism that is falling on our Sunni people.” Sheikh Said on the 
other hand sees that the current electoral system is not fair. The 1960s electoral law 
does not grant the right representation and does not represent people’s voice. He 
adds, “We demand a proportional electoral system and till now it is being rejected. If 
this electoral law is present we may participate. We participate to remove the 
despotism and to voice out the demands. We despise political elites because they 
were unable to voice out those demands and are still unable to do so.” 
On the other hand Sheikh Mohammad, a prominent Sheikh in Tebenneh area, who 
had a role in Tripoli incidents along the past years indirectly revealed his 
unwillingness to participate. Sheikh Mohammad spoke on behalf of all Islamists 
rather than his own beliefs. He said, “All Islamists see that there are two separate 
reasons behind abstaining from participation. The first is deprivation and the second 
is religious. For him, Islamists’ participation in the Arab countries has not been 
promising and were not encouraging. When Islamists joined the democratic game, 
the previous experiences seemed to be non-promising. When Islamists reached 
power, or participated in governments, a certain conspiracy was prepared to get rid of 
them. As Sheikh Mohammad was referring to all Islamists in his answers, it was 
essential to ask him about his own specific beliefs; he did not want to answer. It was 
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very clear that he shared the same beliefs yet was not feeling very safe to reveal that. 
He adds, “There is no benefit for Islamists to participate, because they want to show 
the Islamists as failures.  
Sheikh Ali 5on the other hand who although is very close to Sheikh Da’ii Al Shahal 
yet has different political views from the latter when it comes to political 
participation. According to Sheikh Ali, Sheikh Da’ii does not refuse to participate 
but he does. “I am not willing to participate in this system as I believe the true 
governance should be under the rule of Islam. Issuing laws is the right of God and 
not people. This is based on Islamic ideology. We have no problem in participating 
in the administrative part but not in the political system where they legalize what 
God forbids and vice versa. If participation pushes away harm, then it may possible. 
Yet in the current system we are being punished and held accountable because we 
have Islamic beliefs. Most of Islamists are in prisons because they want to apply 
Islam6; why is it acceptable for a communist to call for communism, for a democratic 
to call for democracy and not for Muslims to call for Islamic rule?” When asked why 
he thinks this is happening, he answered “It is because it is not allowed to have a 
strong Sunni state. The Islamic Arab regimes are extension of Western countries. 
They do not represent the real Islam. Those regimes played a role in allowing the 
creation of an Alawite state in Syria for example but not a Sunni Islamic state 
anywhere. In Algeria, Muslims were not allowed to form an Islamic state; similarly, 
this happened with Mursi in Egypt; although we do not support Muslim brotherhood, 
it was a game to withdraw Muslims from the rule. All of this pushes a normal 
Muslim towards extremism. I would like to note here that they forced Muslims to 
                                                          
5 Is also a given name 
6 Sheikh Ali was arrested and prisoned several times 
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extremism, and I do not want to call it extremism, I would like to call it equal 
treatment: you get served what you deserve. Look at how Russia is bombarding 
civilians; look at how they treat Muslims all over the world. It is forbidden for any 
Arab country to call for an Islamic state but it is okay for anyone else to call for 
whatever they want. French President Hollande7 said it once when Algerians won the 
elections, no Islamic state shall be on my next door.  ISIS are treating others as they 
are treated. They are using different means but still the goal is one, killing 
innocents.” Looking deeply into this, it is certain that those thoughts are encouraging 
exclusionary politics and detachment from the Lebanese political system.  
4.2.2. Theme 2: Relative deprivation 
 
The intention of this thesis is to link relative deprivation to exclusionary politics. In 
this regards it was essential to measure relative deprivation. In the below sections 
more emphasis is given to the topic.  
4.2.2.1 Relative deprivation measured   
It was very clear from the answers that deprivation played a role in all Islamists’ 
decisions. Measuring deprivation was not something tangible, that’s why the second 
question focused on Islamists’ needs rather than directly on relative deprivation. In 
this regards, the results showed that Islamists want to be treated fairly, and to have 
equal balance of power with the country in compared to what other parties enjoy. All 
four Islamists answered similarly. See figure 5. 
 
                                                          
7 François Gérard Georges Nicolas Hollande is a French politician, who has been the President of 
France since 2012 
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Figure 5: Islamists needs and demands 
 
All Islamists requested justice, equal employment opportunities, reviving Tripoli, fair 
treatment for Islamists, all of which are not provided by the current political system. 
Their common question was then why would they participate in such an unfair 
system? Sheikh Ahmad says, “We request justice. I see despotism falling on our 
Sunni Umma, and the government is not taking action. We ask for equal 
development of all the Lebanese regions.  Development starts from Beirut and stops 
in Batroun8. In Tripoli there are no employment opportunities. The economy of the 
city needs to be revived, which is the total opposite of what is happening at the 
moment. For instance, some ships like the Iron ships are not allowed to enter our 
port. They go instead to Beirut port and all the economic gains go there.” 
Researching this aspect, I found out the Head of Customs belongs to Amal party, a 
party closely affiliated with Hezbollah.  
                                                          
8 A city just before Tripoli , it is around 27 km away from Tripoli 
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Similarly Sheikh Said states “our demand is justice. Justice in order to provide 
dignity for people. What do we see know? Arbitrarily and unjustified detentions, bad 
unjust treatment in prisons, no employment opportunities. Tripoli is deprived but that 
deprivation is done on purpose, it is applied in such a way that it is organized and 
strategic. There are places in the country that are very developed while Tripoli is 
below underdeveloped. We demand justice so that it provides dignified living 
opportunities to Sunni people. Sheikh Said adds, “Lebanon is a nice state within its 
different components. The Christian presence gives us some sort of protection from 
the dictatorships in the neighborhood. This presence gave Lebanon a print of 
freedom of expression. If we were only Sunnis and Shiites we would have been a 
replication of what is happening in Syria at the moment.”9 
Sheikh Mohammad on the other hand says “We ask for the right to practice our 
religion and call for it without any consequences. We demand equality between all 
citizens and we don’t see this happening by any chance. They shed the lights on 
Islamists but they do not do so on other groups who has a totalitarian mentality, 
referring to Hezbollah without naming it. As for the current pluralism in religions 
and sects, federalism is the only way out. There is no other option but federalism. 
Today if Hezbollah governs what will happen with the rest. The only solution to the 
current political mess is federalism.”  
Sheikh Ali sees that Islamists are obliged to live with other groups in Lebanon and 
therefore their demands are to have access to rights just as any other partner in the 
country.  He mentions “We as Sunnis are not just a group in the country, we are an 
Umma in the world. In the country they diminished our power and they did not grant 
                                                          
9 Meaning there would have been a civil war in Lebanon 
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us our rights. We want our rights that they confessed we should have. We look for 
justice, for employment opportunities and for economic revival.” Sheikh Ali sees that 
democracy should be applied in the right way so that anyone who wants to 
participate in the political system can do so. He adds, “Unfortunately today elections 
are played with and politicians in the end find a way that fits them and secures their 
representation.”  
Speaking of solutions to the current complications, Sheikh Ahmad thinks that the 
Sunni political and religious leaders need to play their role in responding to the issue 
of deprivation. They should invest their money inside the city. He gives the example 
of Iran and the enormous financial support it offers to Hezbollah. On the other side, 
he gives the gulf countries as an example of the support they provide to Tripoli. 
Comparing the Iranian and Saudi financial resources the support is almost null. 
Sheikh Ahmad asks “Why don’t we open Bahsas factory and Tripoli citadel. The 
political leaders hold the responsibility of this deprivation. There should be 
collaboration in order to remove deprivation of the Sunnis.” Sheikh Mohammad 
thinks that the best way to diminish relative deprivation is to remove the authority 
from those who are despotizing Sunnis and marginalizing them. Sheikh Ali similarly 
sees that deprivation can be lessened through re-activating facilities in Tripoli for 
example Kolayaat airport, the Citadel, Tripoli port and many others. All what is 
mentioned above falls back on deprivation, injustice and unfairness.  
4.2.2.2 Relative deprivation resolved 
The other part of the study intends to check if all of the Islamists’ needs or demands 
are met, would they participate in the government? The question was formulized in a 
way that does not directly ask this rather it questions whether Islamists would sit 
aside to Hezbollah on the same table, i.e. participate alongside with that group. The 
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reason was to check whether the Islamists are willing to participate in the Lebanese 
consociational system even if it entails sharing the governance with Hezbollah, the 
party they always compare their resources to and always speak of its privilege over 
theirs. The results show that if those demands are met Islamists are not willing to sit 
next to Hezbollah and the reason is the latter’s participation in the Syrian Civil War, 
or as they put it  “killing Sunnis in Syria.” This says it all. Again relative deprivation 
is coming into play indirectly. Islamists think Sunnis are being shut down and killed 
by Hezbollah in Syria. This is why any dialogue with Hezbollah will not be feasible 
as long as the party is fighting in Syria. In terms of sharing the political system with 
Hezbollah, Sheikh Ahmad says “there are some Islamic parties that already sit with 
Hezbollah in Ramadan for instance. Others do not sit not only due to relative 
deprivation but because of Hezbollah’s war against the Sunnis in Syria.” Sheikh 
Mohammad clearly stated, “As Islamists, we cannot forget what Hezbollah s doing 
inside Syria, the participation in Syria is not balanced. So we will never collaborate 
with Hezbollah because of this participation. ” All Islamists did not show any 
possible collaboration with the party due to its participation in the Syrian Civil War. 
Moreover, Islamists were clearly differentiating between how Hezbollah’s 
participation is seen as something acceptable whereas when Islamists show interest 
in participating alongside the rebels in Syria they are directly accused of being 
terrorists. It is clear though that the issue of Hezbollah is not constricted to relative 
deprivation, the war inside Syria has deteriorated everything. Sheikh Nabil mentions, 
“We had previously visions and opinions of Hezbollah and now all those views are 
confirmed. We are different religiously but also politically and ethically.” 
Analyzing this it is clear relative deprivation is a hidden factor. Therefore, 
incorporating Islamists in the Lebanese consociational system entails diminishing 
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relative deprivation not only within the same country but also outside. Having 
Islamists cooperate with the current Lebanese system demands diminishing relative 
deprivation that is illustrated in Hezbollah’s war against Sunnis inside Syria. 
 
4.2.3 Theme 3: Islamists replicating Hezbollah’s model: new Sunni 
representatives 
In terms of Sunni representation, all Islamists interviewed recognize that Islamic 
groups do not represent the Sunni public mass. , as shown in figure 6.  
 
Figure 6: Islamists' views on their Sunni representation 
In fact, Islamists stated that Islamic groups represent only 7% of the society. The 
political parties do not represent the majority of Sunnis neither. The majority of 
people are not represented by anyone.  According to them, Sunnis at the moment are 
weak because the Sunni members of parliament did not voice out their demands. 
Tripoli Sunnis are not accepting Islamists representation and the latter did not 
succeed in this yet due to several reasons. The first and utmost reason behind this 
failure in representation is that Islamists themselves are scattered and not united. 
Islamists could not lead representation because each group has its own agenda. 
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Another reason behind this failure is because they were unable to diminish 
despotism. According to them their failure emerges from the current system in 
Lebanon. For them, this system is a copy of the Syrian regime. The government is 
suppressing the Muslim youth in all means. One of them mentions, “The government 
is refusing to issue Islamists passports just because they are Muslim believers. He 
adds “The council of ministers stopped this decision but it is still being done because 
everyone is working on their own and when it comes to us they want us to abide by 
the rules.” Islamists feel that despotism is in front of everyone’s eyes and yet no one 
is taking action to limit that. According to Sheikh Mohmmad,” Islamists are closer to 
representation than others but they do not represent the majority. They are lost and 
do not trust the government.” Sheikh Said on the other hand emphasizes that 
Islamists at least did not change their values as some other politicians did. For them, 
Hariri did not stay on the same values, he was dishonest. Hariri’s latest proposal to 
suggest Franjieh for the presidential seat was a shock for Islamists.  
Do Islamists stand a chance of becoming the new Sunni representatives given the 
vacant Sunni leadership? Is it possible that those groups imitate Hezbollah’s earlier 
successful experience and get integrated into the Lebanese consociational system? A 
small discussion of the research compared Hezbollah to Islamists. Some discussions 
questioned the possibility of that group replicating Hezbollah’s model. The results 
above show that Islamists are not willing to join the Lebanese consociational system. 
If that is the case, Hezbollah’s replication becomes difficult. Cutting through this 
subject some questions focused on the comparison between the two to capture future 
possibilities of replication. Answers declared that there is no minimum similarity 
between Hezbollah and Islamists mainly due to the lack of support Islamists face. 
There is no state that sponsors Islamists as Hezbollah previously had. Saudi Arabia is 
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the least supporting. Iran supported and is still supporting Hezbollah to a very high 
extent, yet no one supported Islamists before and no one is supporting them at the 
moment. This illustrates why Islamists feel relatively deprived. The support 
Hezbollah receives in compared to the support they receive is almost null. According 
to them, Turkey in that sense is still very new to supporting Islamists and is not very 
open to them as well. Some Islamists declared that replication of Hezbollah’s earlier 
experience will not happen because there is no common agenda for Islamists and 
there is no leadership. Yet a lesson learned from Hezbollah would be their patience. 
The party faced many difficulties and challenges and had patience to reach their goal, 
to have power and authority over the whole country according to what Islamists 
think. In their beliefs there is no real country there is only Hezbollah. 
In short, Islamists’ participation in the government is reliable on deprivation. 
Relative deprivation appeared more often though at times indirectly. As there is 
despotism participation will not bring anything new, it will only burn Islamists and 
that’s why they are not looking into being part of the Lebanese consociational 
system. All of the interviewees viewed the current Lebanese system as unfair and 
unjust. For them, and based on their own experiences for years now, the only system 
that would bring justice is the Islamic one. However, Islamists are very aware that 
having an Islamic state or governance in Lebanon is not feasible. That was very clear 
from the answers provided. All four Islamists saw that this goal could be very 
difficult to attain yet meanwhile they are looking at a fair system that governs the 
country and provides them with their basic equal rights. Within the current system 
the minimum equality is not provided and that’s why Islamists resolve to 
exclusionary politics. It is despotism and injustice that is leading Islamists to 
extremism. One of the Sheikhs mentions “in prisons I saw people who come with 
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10% extremism and they left with 100% due to the despotism they saw inside and the 
treatment they were receiving. There are some prisons like the Riyhaniyeh for 
example where no one is allowed in and no one is allowed to flag mistreatments 
happening inside.” The Riyhaniyeh prison belongs to the Military Police10 which 
makes a perfect link to why some Islamists oppose the Lebanese army. Others refer 
to how Muslim youth are detained and prisoned as children and leave as complete 
extremists due to the treatment they receive inside prisons. Therefore, Islamists in 
general are not willing to participate in the current present system, some of them see 
participation as a small phase towards working for the larger goal which is calling for 
an Islamic just state that preserves their rights and values. Others are relying on the 
Syrian war, therefore those do foresee a chance for them to participate in the 
Lebanese system if Syrian rebels win over the Syrian regime. Participation here 
would be participation of the strong along the strong. What is common among all 
Islamists though is that they wish that they are treated as anyone else, no one crosses 
the line of others and everyone is equal in rights.  
                                                          
10 The Military Police is part of the Lebanese army 
  
 
63 
 
 
Chapter Five 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the last decade, Islamic movements in Lebanon have gained power in the 
Lebanese politics. Many of these groups have enjoyed freedom in the country 
leaving major consequences behind. This freedom along with the political 
occurrences in the Middle East have led to the emergence of radical Islamic groups 
leaving the country unable to cope with those militias and incapable of putting an 
end to their rising power and their threat to security. Tripoli has been lately known as 
the home of Islamist groups. The city being close to the Lebanese –Syrian borders 
bears the major burden of the ongoing neighboring Syrian Civil War allowing more 
than 1,067,785 Syrian refugees in the country11. Many radical Muslims fleeing their 
country found in this city the safe haven to practice their ideology and “terrorism.” 
Although political reasons play a major role in determining the causes behind rise of 
Islamism; the real reasons behind this occurrence are not easily detected or agreed 
upon. This dissertation intends to understand the link between relative deprivation 
and Islamists’ exclusionary politics in northern Lebanon. Many research has been 
done on Tripoli Islamists yet there has been minor previous linkage between how 
feelings of deprivation may yield to exclusionary politics and sometimes to 
extremism. The study therefore first questions Islamists’ willingness to participate in 
the Lebanese consociational system and then delves into the conditions of having this 
                                                          
11 Those are the registered Syrians as per UNHCR information up last updated on 31 Jan 2016 
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participation implemented. In short, the central questions is “Are Tripoli Islamists 
willing to join the Lebanese consociational system and under what conditions?”  
It has been very well known that Islamists strive to have an Islamic state in Lebanon. 
Yet within the changes in the political occurrences inside Syria and the effects of that 
on Lebanon, questions were raised whether Islamists at the moment are open to 
being part of the Lebanese system. In other words, does it look predictable that 
Islamists could imitate Hezbollah’s earlier experience and get integrated in the 
Lebanese consociational system? As it has been very clear that many Salafists who 
were Da’wa people are clearly getting involved in the political events, the question 
becomes more vivid of whether Islamists are actually looking at joining the Lebanese 
political game. On the other hand, within their discourses Islamists have always 
reflected the marginalization of Sunni people in the government and their continuous 
deprivation. So participation seems unclear and hence questioning that was essential. 
The intention to which Islamists would accept consociationalism was one aspect and 
then whether Tripoli Sunni residents feel represented by those groups is another one. 
Yet the research does not look into the second aspect, rather part of the research 
relies on a study that questions Tripoli residents of what they think the main reason 
behind extremism are. The main focus of the study depends on the current Sunni 
vacant leadership. In this regards, within this vacant leadership, do Islamists stand a 
chance to represent Sunnis? Are they actually looking for that? What are the pre-
conditions prior to any participation and what hinders participation? Those are the 
questions that the research answers.  
5.1 Relative deprivation and integration: the link 
Relative deprivation theory states that whenever there is a discrepancy between what 
is expected and what is actually received people tend to shift to violence. The process 
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starts with dissatisfaction and frustration, and frustration often leads to aggression. 
The theory considers that terrorism or extremism is the outcome of feelings of 
injustice. Feelings of injustice are caused by the fact that what an individual 
“actually” receives is way less than what s/he is “entitled” to have (Richardson, 
2011). In the MENA region, Islamists are feeling deprived and dominated by the 
west. Dominance is mainly revealed through cultural takeover. Salafists-Jihadists are 
trying to re-establish their culture and denounce western dominance. “People 
frequently mobilize in reaction to threats” (Hansen, n.d, p. 25). Individuals mobilize 
when there is threat towards their basic rights, and values. Islamic activism arises due 
to injustice. It is an outcome of both internal and external threats. Once opportunities 
become available this activism becomes mobilization (Hansen). Discrimination leads 
to frustration and frustrated Muslims become more extremists. In other words, 
according to Islamists in northern Lebanon, they have been receiving an unfair 
treatment and therefore resolved to exclusionary politics most of the times. 
Within the current fear of the Shiite and Alawite’s takeover, a large segment of the 
Sunni youth has been attracted to the Islamist’s appeal. Youth are being mobilized 
based on sectarian lines and sympathy was mainly associated with feelings of 
deprivation and despotism. This thesis draws an investigatory situational analysis in 
order to understand the political discourses of Islamists in Northern Lebanon. It 
questions their willingness to join the Lebanese consociational system and explores 
the pre-requisites to that. Is Islamists’ participation linked to deprivation? If so, will 
diminishing relative deprivation yield to their participation? The hypothesis assumed 
that relative deprivation yields to exclusionary political discourse. If we are speaking 
of Islamists’ integration, relative deprivation should diminish. Balance of power is 
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essential prior to any discussion of integration or cooperation. Therefore, diminishing 
relative deprivation should happen before speaking of any political participation.  
5.2 Methodology 
 
The dissertation is an investigatory research that explores the political discourses of 
Islamists in Northern Lebanon in order to reveal a potential pattern toward 
consociational politics.  The central research question investigates whether Islamists 
are looking to become part of the Lebanese political system at the moment. In this 
regards, would relative deprivation that Islamists continuously speak of affect their 
choice of participating in the Lebanese consociational system, or are there other 
variables that play a role in their political choices? While researching the subject, 
available resources did not provide a clear idea of where Islamists are positioned 
currently. Some literature clearly declared that Islamists are not willing to participate 
in any political arrangement while other research was not very clear on the topic. 
Some of the Islamists for instance had already nominated themselves to elections 
while members of the same groups were refusing participation. This ambiguity 
emphasized the importance of having a qualitative methodology to better understand 
the current situation. Therefore, information collection relies on the content of some 
discourses and speeches made by Islamists. The study employs individual in-depth 
semi-structured interviews. Interviews questioned Islamists about their willingness to 
participate in the Lebanese consociational system and delved into the reasons behind 
their decision. The questions therefore intended to link relative deprivation to 
Islamists political participation.  
Quantitatively, the research relies on a study done with Tripoli Sunni residents 
questioning their thoughts on the reasons behind the rise of extremism in the city. 
The study called “Radical Islamic movements in Tripoli: The Relative Deprivation 
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Theory”, was conducted in 2014. Results asserted that relative derivation is a major 
factor behind this rise of extremism in the city. 
The thesis approach therefore combines qualitative and quantitative methodologies in 
an attempt to answer the central question. When it came to conducting interviews, 
the process was not very easy. In the beginning reaching Islamists happened through 
personal connections. Yet many of them were very hesitant about participation and 
some of them firmly rejected taking part of the interviews. So much effort has been 
put into building trust and clarifying the goal of the project. However, some Islamists 
were still not convinced to participate. The consequence of this directly implicated 
the studied sample. Instead of originally interviewing eight Islamists the sample was 
decreased to four and efforts were gathered to choose the most prominent four 
Islamists in Tripoli. It was very essential to respect the wish of those Islamists and 
respect their decision rather than pressuring them to participate. On the other hand, 
some Islamists have been very cooperative and welcoming. Those were already very 
open in their political discourses.  
The first step was to introduce the participant to the research study and aim. The 
approved IRB form was given as part of the supporting document. Following an 
introduction, establishing rapport was essential. The participant needed to feel at ease 
and therefore active listening was employed and fears and concerns were understood. 
The study gave the participants the right to refrain from answering any question or 
withdraw at any time. Names were kept confidential and given names were rather 
used in the study. The conducted interviews went very smoothly and some answers 
were common among all Islamists especially those related to Hezbollah. On some 
topics the same answers were shared at many times. 
5.3 Reasons behind the rise of extremism: Tripoli Sunnis’ views 
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As it has been frequently discussed, Sunni Islamists feel deprived and threatened. 
Those feelings were sometimes shared with Sunni residents in Tripoli. As incidents 
were escalating and extremism has been on the rise, it was vital to check with Tripoli 
Sunnis the causes behind the rise in Islamist radicalism in the northern city of 
Lebanon. Some scholars would argue that this rise is due to socio-economic 
shortages. Others would argue that the reason is purely political, mostly significant 
after the Syrian civil war and its effect into Lebanon. The psychological and 
ideological factors also seem influential on this occurrence. Yet the major reason 
seems to be related to the relative deprivation theory. A study titled, Radical Islamic 
movements in Tripoli: The Relative Deprivation Theory” was done in 2014 on 60 
Tripoli residents in poor Sunni areas questioning why they think radical Islamism has 
been lately rising in Tripoli. The findings of this study were reinforcing previous 
literature about the matter. Results showed that the issue of relative deprivation and 
injustice Tripoli Sunnis feel is the main cause behind the need to acquire power 
mainly in the form of joining radical Islamic movements (Barakeh, 2014). In this 
regards, relative deprivation seems to be discussed among Islamists and residents as 
well and therefore giving this topic the right attention and focus was essential. This is 
where the thesis comes to link exclusionary politics to relative deprivation. 
5.4 Relative deprivation indirectly yields to exclusionary politics 
 
Following the outburst of the Arab uprisings, events in the Arab countries had 
affected the political stances of many Islamists. Events in Egypt and Libya had 
majorly affected how Islamists look at their role in the region. Similarly and with 
greater impact, events in Syria had majorly affected the political approach of 
Islamists in Lebanon and specifically in Tripoli.  Islamists had been mainly 
conservative about participating in the Lebanese consociational system. Yet, the 
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escalation of events in the Syrian Civil War and the participation of Hezbollah along 
the Syrian regime, and the absence of a Sunni leadership made it unclear whether 
Islamists still have the same political strategy. Due to the fact that Islamists refer to 
their deprivation in almost every speech they make, questioning the link between 
relative deprivation and political orientation was essential. This dissertation links 
relative deprivation to Islamists political participation. The study result shows that 
75% of Islamists are not willing to participate in the Lebanese consociational system. 
Analyzing the reasons highlights the role of relative deprivation in the non-
participatory model. Islamists’ justifications of their stand revolved around one 
aspect, and that was justice. According to them, they are not willing to participate in 
the current political system because it is unjust. They are in fact striving to have an 
Islamic state which according to them is not possible at the moment. Again, when 
delving deeper into this, it was clear that for them an Islamic state would bring 
justice and equality that the current system does not guarantee for Sunnis. Therefore, 
within the imbalance of power Islamists are diverging away from the state towards 
an exclusionary political system. Participation in the Lebanese political bodies would 
not bring any change. The unfair system is further pushing them away from the state 
and closer to their own state of affairs. Unfairness and relative deprivation act as 
reinforcing factors behind their inherited thoughts of political practices.  
5.5 Islamists replicating Hezbollah’s model: New Sunni 
representatives 
The thesis addresses another aspect which is the Sunni representation comparing this 
representation to that of Hezbollah. Within the current Sunni vacant leadership, do 
Islamists stand a chance to become the new Sunni representatives? Could it be 
possible that Sunnis imitate Hezbollah’s earlier experience and join the Lebanese 
consociational system? In the study it was obvious that Islamists are divided among 
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different assemblies and agendas. According to all the interviewed Islamists, they do 
not represent the bulk of Sunnis in the city due to the fact that they are not united. 
Representation therefore is weakened by their divisions. In comparison to Hezbollah, 
all Islamists saw that there is minimum similarities between the two parties if none at 
all. In their views, Islamists never had the support Hezbollah enjoys through Iran. 
Although the main aim of the comparison was not to check future possibilities of 
replication and not to measure relative deprivation in this section, yet the answers 
Islamists provided referred to relative deprivation again. For them, Hezbollah 
controls the country politically, and economically. The privileged party has all it asks 
for and can do whatever it wants to. In short, given the available resources and 
circumstances, it seems far-fetched that Islamists would imitate Hezbollah’s 
experience at least not at the short run. 
5.6 Extremism in Islam: Future prospects 
 
Islamic extremism has been grasping the attention of the international community 
since September 2011. Nowadays after the eruption of ISIS, Islamic extremism 
became a worldwide focus. The Charlie Hebdo incidents and the Paris attacks 
deteriorated how non-Muslims view the religion itself associating Islam with 
terrorism. Looking at the incident from an Islamist’s points of view, the incidents of 
Charlie Hebdo were normal acts following an attack on the Muslim’s Prophet. They 
were humiliated and disrespected and the ordinary reaction was to respond back to 
this. For them, the first action triggered their aggressive reaction.  
Religious extremism is not only found in Islam. There are hundreds of Christian, 
Jewish, Hindu and other terrorist organizations. The Lord Resistance Army, the Ku 
Klux Klan , the National Liberation Front of Tripura , The Orange Volunteers and 
many more are all Christian terrorist organizations that are equal to ISIS (Here are 8 
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Christian Terrorist Organizations That Equal ISIS, 2015.) Those organizations are 
widespread and just as bad as the Islamic terrorists groups are. “The only difference 
between Christian Terrorism and Islamic terrorism is that Christian Terrorism never 
makes the evening news” (Here are 8 Christian Terrorist Organizations That Equal 
ISIS, 2015, p. 1). Many has been confusing all Islamists with ISIS. Although the 
reasons behind the Islamic extremism eruption seem to be vague, it is clear that ISIS 
is the child of despotism that has spread the region. That's why unsurprisingly its 
power base is in Iraq and Syria where Saddam Hussein and Bashar Al-Asad 
governed with despotism for decades familiarizing crimes against humanity. If the 
aim is to fight ISIS the root causes should be fought (Woodward, 2014).   
What are the conditions that lead to the rise of radical movements? Answering this 
question seems hard when many factors play a role in this occurrence and not only 
one. Some would argue that the causes behind this emergence are socio-economic 
factors. The rise in the unemployment rate and the decline in education has led to an 
increase in favor of radicalism. Others would see that political reasons merely stand 
behind this rise. Political figures tend to be strengthening radical groups for political 
goals and the easiest way to do so would be through religion. Others would argue 
that the rise of those groups is the result of what they see as an unfair balance of 
powers. The Shiite extreme power in Lebanon illustrated by Hezbollah caused Sunni 
groups to acquire power in order to have some sort of equilibrium and protect the 
Sunni Umma. This explanation is directly related to the theory of relative 
deprivation. Whether the causes are socio economic, psychological, political, or 
based on the relative deprivation theory is something arguable. While it seems 
challenging to have a one answer to this question relative deprivation seems to offer 
a comprehensive explanation of many extremists’ behaviors. This does not mean that 
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there are no other factors play a role in the rise of extremism, yet the major reason 
behind the rise of those groups in Northern Lebanon relies on the feeling of injustice 
among Sunnis (Barakeh, 2014).  
Islam is not the only religion that produced violent militant fundamentalist 
movements in the world but it has been very difficult to detect the real factors behind 
Islamic fundamentalism or radicalism. A person’s psychological make-up, 
ideological goals, or socio economic status all play a role in this occurrence. An 
individual may decide terrorism fits his or her own view of the world—that it makes 
sense. A group may come to use terrorism because it furthers and is supported by 
their ideology (Peace, n.d). Finally, groups or persons may use terrorism because of 
financial deprivation, poverty and the need of money and the unemployment they 
suffer, which was happening for some time in Tripoli. Economic factors played a 
major role in encouraging Islamism in Tripoli, yet feelings of deprivation were even 
more influential. People in Tripoli feel that they are relatively powerless in compare 
to other political parties in the country, mainly Hezbollah. They feel the need to 
protect themselves and hence call for a balance of power. Thus joining radical 
Islamic groups seems to be one way to achieve a power equilibrium and self-defense. 
Injustice Sunnis are feeling in their own country leads them to the path of radicalism.  
Islamists in northern Lebanon generally strive to call for an Islamic state. At the 
moment this goal seems very difficult and a bit farfetched. Islamists themselves 
realize that this is the reality. Calling for an Islamic state is not an easy objective and 
involves geopolitics as well. So far Islamists are not willing to join any political 
arrangement especially when it comes to joining an unjust and imbalanced Lebanese 
consociational system. For them the Lebanese government has not showed positive 
intentions towards them. Rather, they have been treated with discrimination and 
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despotism throughout their presence. Within that situation, participation does not 
seem to be possible. That kind of participation is what some Islamists referred to as 
the participation of the weak alongside the strong who are mainly Hezbollah. It is 
clear how thoughts and feelings of discrimination, despotism and injustice lead to a 
more exclusionary political discourse. That is what relative deprivation theory is 
about. Understanding relative deprivation and how it leads to frustration which then 
leads to violence can possibly help in containing extremism in Lebanon and the 
region. I say extremism in general because Islam is not the only religion that has 
produced radical and extremist groups be it Islamic, Christian, Jewish, Hindu or any 
other religion. Last but not least, deprivation, discrimination, despotism, injustice or 
repression is unpleasant. The natural outcome of such treatments is frustration, anger 
and fury. These kind of feelings will ultimately yield to aggression especially when 
those feelings are continuously reinforced within the same group. Lessening those 
feelings will lessen the aggression and gradually lead to peace. 
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